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Preface
This thesis was written during my enrollment as a PhD-student at the Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen from February 2007 through November 2010. I am grateful for the help-
ful guidance from my thesis advisors Thomas Rønde and Hans Christian Kongsted. Thomas was my
advisor when I wrote my Master’s thesis in the area of technology spillovers and labour mobility that
developed into the application for my PhD-project. Throughout my PhD-studies, he has continu-
ously been willing to discuss potential research questions and methods with me. When I began the
work on this thesis, it was a specific aim to make an empirical contribution, and I appreciate the
guidance I received from HC in carrying out this work.
As part of my PhD-studies, I visited the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in London for five months
in the spring of 2008. I would like to thank Rachel Griffith and the people in the Productivity and
Innovation section for their hospitality during my visit. I worked on the first chapter of the thesis dur-
ing this stay, and I received valuable comments and suggestions for improvements. It was rewarding
to be part of the research environment at IFS, and in the process of writing this thesis I have drawn
in multiple ways on inspiration from this stay and on insights into the field of economic geography
that it offered. I am grateful for the financial support that I received for my stay in London from the
"EliteForsk"-initiative under the Ministry of Science and Technology.
The thesis has gained from suggestions and remarks by seminar participants and encourage-
ments from colleagues in the Department of Economics. In particular, throughout the duration of the
programme I have greatly valued the friendly, informal environment among the PhD-students. Our
discussions on economics, social gatherings, and importantly our exchange of invaluable know-how
have contributed to making my work both easier and more fun. Finally, the many hours of encour-
agement and support that I have received from good friends and my family mean a lot to me.
Kathrine Thrane Bløcher
Copenhagen, November 2010
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Summary
This thesis falls within the field of economic geography. All chapters share a focus on mobility of
workers in local labour markets but can be read as independent essays. The two first chapters are
specifically concerned with mobility of technicians and scientists in research intensive industries
whereas the aim of the third chapter is to show that interfirm mobility of labour, in general, is an ex-
planatory force behind agglomeration of manufacturing industries.
Chapter 1 and 2 are closely related as they both are concerned with research intensive economic en-
vironments in which technicians and scientist-employees learn valuable know-how from their em-
ployer that can be used with other employers and potential competitors. On the one hand, this is
costly to firms because competitors in this way buy into their knowledge-base, or simply because it
forces the firms to pay higher wages to retain key workers. On the other hand, many research inten-
sive industries are also highly agglomerated which greatly facilitates mobility, and this suggests that
in some industries high rates of mobility and interfirm technology diffusion are mutually advanta-
geous to firms. On this background both papers are concerned with the impact of mobility on the
research investments of firms.
Human capital theory suggests that – since learning increases future earnings – workers should be
willing to compensate employers for R&D-learning by accepting lower wages, particularly early in
their career. The empirical analysis in chapter 1 uses Danish register data for the pharmaceutical in-
dustry to study this hypothesis. I estimate and compare wage-profiles for workers at R&D plants with
otherwise similar workers at other types of pharmaceutical plants. I restrict the sample to workers
with a technical or scientific education that is of relevance to pharmaceutical research in order to
focus the analysis on workers that are most likely to be employed at the research core of the plant.
Furthermore, I divide the sample into two groups according to the length of education: 1) Workers
with vocational education or a Bachelor’s degree (medium-level technical education) and 2) Workers
with a Master’s or PhD-degree.
I start by considering the male part of the workforce, and I find that male employees at R&D-active
plants with a Master’s or PhD degree take a wage-discount of around 4-10% early in their career in re-
turn for higher earnings later. In particular, recent R&D experience is a source of significantly higher
wages for this group of workers. For the female part of the workforce with a Master’s or PhD degree,
the estimated coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude than for men, but statistically as signif-
icant. The results for technical workers are mixed in the sense that R&D-workers seem to reach the
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earning-levels of technical workers at other pharmaceutical plants only late in their career. Nonethe-
less, overall, the results suggests that the value of R&D-learning in the pharmaceutical industry is at
least partly internalised in the labour market. Furthermore, the estimations provide indirect evidence
in favour of theories arguing that labour mobility is a source of knowledge transfers.
The theoretical analysis in chapter 2 takes its starting point from a number of empirical investigations
establishing that multinational companies increasingly locate development activities in the leading
science centres of the world in order to gain access to advanced technological know-how. In this
sense they can be said to "listen in on new ideas" with the aim of using these for their own purposes,
and this raises questions with respect to the effect on research investments in those regions.
I develop a model of a local research intensive industry in which entering firms (imitators) learn
about the latest technological know-how by hiring experienced scientists from local research firms.
There are two countervailing effects on research investments. As in traditional models of innovation
and imitation, a research firm invests less in its research project as imitation lowers the value of a
successful innovation by e.g. lowering its commercial value. However, by modeling the contribution
of scientist-employees to the research projects I specify a positive feedback effect to innovation. En-
try of multiple imitators competing for human capital create an attractive labour market to scientists
that have participated in successful research projects and thereby have a positive effect on their in-
centives. Thus, I hypothesise that these scientists contribute more, in terms of e.g. creativity and
persistence, to research projects. Non-compete clauses offer protection against employee mobility,
but the results of the model point to cases in which strong wage-competition increases the profitabil-
ity of research projects. In these cases, the scientific output of an industry is highest if firms refrain
from including such clauses in the employment contract.
Chapter 3 is empirical and broadens the focus from R&D-intensive industries to all of manufacturing.
I test a prominent theory in the economy geographic literature stating that firms form industrial clus-
ters to share a common pool of labour. The register data provided by Statistics Denmark contain the
detailed labour market and geographical information necessary to carry out the analysis. I test two
formal arguments. The first of these states that firms form industrial clusters in order to diminish the
effect of productivity shocks on wages. The reason is that in isolation, employment changes at the es-
tablishment level affect local wages making it difficult for the establishment to expand in response to
a positive productivity shock whereas clustering facilitates mobility of workers from low-productivity
firms to high-productivity firms. I use a measure based on employment changes at the plant level to
account for this theory.
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An alternative theory proposes that competition for skills among multiple firms in the same lo-
cation induces workers to invest in their human capital because workers expect a return to their
investment. Hence, this idea proposes that similarity in the use of skills leads firms to locate in geo-
graphical vicinity. I use a functional definition of skills that distinguishes workers according to both
length and field of education, and I use correlations between the skill mix at the plant and the rest of
the industry to determine how homogeneous the industry is in its use of skills.
I find that variations across industries in the potential for re-allocating workers across low and
high productivity firms explain the geographical patterns of location in the data set. On the contrary,
the idea that firms locate together because it increases the skill level of workers does not find support
in the data. However, the data shows that similarity in formal qualifications play a role in relation to
the ability of firms to re-allocate workers. In an extension, I find that this is even more the case in the
diverse, urban labour market compared to specialised industrial clusters.
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Dansk resumé
Kapitlerne i denne afhandling deler et fælles tema; mobilitet af arbejdskraft i lokale arbejdsmarkeder,
men kapitlerne kan alle læses uafhængigt af hinanden. I de to første kapitler er fokus på mobilitet
af teknikere og forskere i forskningsintensive industrier, mens jeg i det tredje kapitel ser på mobilitet
mellem virksomheder i fremstillingssektoren generelt. Formålet med det sidste kapitel er således at
vise, at mobilitet af medarbejdere generelt er en årsag til, at virksomheder i nogle industrier placerer
sig geografisk tæt på hinanden.
Kapitel 1 og 2 er tæt relaterede. Begge kapitler vedrører således forskningsintensive industrier, i hvilke
teknikere og forskningsansatte opnår værdifuld tekniske viden fra deres arbejdsgiver, som kan anven-
des hos andre arbejdsgivere og potentielle konkurrenter. På den ene side er dette omkostningsfuldt
for virksomhederne, fordi konkurrenter på denne måde kan købe sig adgang til deres vidensbase,
eller simpelthen fordi virksomhederne tvinges til at betale højere lønninger for at fastholde vigtige
medarbejdere. På den anden side er mange forskningsintensive industrier karakteriseret ved, at virk-
somhederne er placeret i geografisk nærhed af hinanden, hvilket netop øger risikoen for at miste en
ansat til en konkurrent. Denne observation tyder på, at høje mobilitetsrater og vidensspredning er til
gensidig fordel for virksomhederne i nogle industrier. På denne baggrund omhandler begge kapitler
effekter af denne type af mobilitet på virksomhedernes investeringer i forskning og udvikling.
Økonomisk teori peger på, at – siden adgang til teknisk viden er værdifuld – vil ansatte være villige
til at kompensere deres arbejdsgiver for læring relateret til forsknings- og udviklingsaktiviteter. Det
kan ske ved, at medarbejderne accepterer lavere lønninger specielt tidligt i deres karriere, hvor de har
stor gavn af læring. Den empiriske analyse i kapitel 1 anvender danske register data for medicinalin-
dustrien til at undersøge denne hypotese. Jeg undersøger hypotesen ved at estimere og sammen-
ligne lønprofiler for ansatte på forskningsarbejdssteder med ansatte på andre typer af arbejdssteder i
medicinalindustrien.
I analysen er datasættet begrænset til ansatte med en teknisk eller videnskabelig uddannelse, der
er relevant for forskning i medicinalindustrien. Det gør jeg for at fokusere analysen på de medar-
bejdere, der har den højeste sandsynlighed for at være tæt på virksomhedens forskningsaktiviteter.
Desuden undersøger jeg effekterne separat for ansatte med henholdsvis en mellemlang uddannelse
og en længerevarende teknisk eller videnskabelig uddannelse.
I hovedanalysen ser jeg på den mandlige del af arbejdsstyrken. I gruppen med en lang videregående
uddannelse betyder ansættelse på et forskningsarbejdssted tidligt i karrieren, at en ansat modtager
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en løn, der er mellem 4 og 10 procent lavere end lønningerne for ansatte på andre typer af arbejds-
pladser. Til gengæld modtager personer med erfaring fra forskningsarbejdssteder højere lønninger
senere i deres karriere. For kvinder med en lang videregående uddannelse er de estimerede løn-
forskelle lidt mindre end for mænd, men også statistisk signifikante. Jeg finder dog lidt mere bland-
ede resultater for teknisk personale med mellemlang uddannelse, men samlet set tyder resultaterne
på, at ansatte i medicinalindustrien i nogen grad kompenserer deres arbejdsgiver for værdien af den
forskningsbaserede læring.
Den teoretiske analyse i kapitel 2 tager udgangspunkt i et antal empiriske undersøgelser, der viser, at
multinationale selskaber i stigende grad placerer aktiviteter i teknologisk førende regioner, fordi det
hjælper selskaberne til at få kendskab til de nyeste teknologier på et tidligt tidspunkt. Dette rejser
spørgsmål med hensyn til effekten på investeringer i forskning i disse regioner.
Jeg udvikler en model for en forskningsintensiv industri, hvor succesfulde projekter kræver, at
virksomheden investerer kapital, og at en forskningsmedarbejder bidrager med human kapital. Sam-
tidig kan udefrakommende virksomheder kopiere den nye teknologiske viden ved at hyre erfarne
forskningsmedarbejdere. Der er to modsatrettede effekter på effektiviteten af forskning af, at den
ansatte kan tage viden om projektet med sig til en imiterende virksomhed. I lighed med traditionelle
modeller for sammenhængen mellem innovation og imitation, investerer virksomheden mindre i
forskning, idet værdien af innovation falder. Men ved at specificere bidraget fra den forskningsansatte
viser jeg, at tilgang af flere imiterende virksomheder skaber et attraktivt arbejdsmarked for succes-
fulde forskningsmedarbejdere, og at dette har en positiv effekt på deres incitament til at bidrage
til forskningsprojektet. Med andre ord jeg foreslår, at forskningsmedarbejdere bidrager med øget
kreativitet, vedholdenhed mv. til virksomhedens forskning. Konkurrenceklausuler beskytter mod
spredning af viden i forbindelse med medarbejdermobilitet, men modellens resultater peger på, at
når der er tilstrækkelig stærk lønkonkurrence blandt de imiterende virksomheder, er det mest pro-
fitabelt for forskningsvirksomhederne ikke at benyttes sig af sådanne klausuler. Det betyder også, at
industriens produktion af forskning i nogle tilfælde vil være større, hvis virksomhederne undlader at
benytte sig af sådanne klausuler.
Kapitel 3 er et empirisk papir, der har et bredere fokus forstået på den måde, at jeg ser på mobilitet
mere generelt i fremstillingssektoren. Jeg tester en vigtig teori inden for økonomisk geografi, der
siger, at virksomheder danner industrielle klynger for at dele en fælles arbejdsstyrke. Register data
fra Danmarks Statistik indeholder detaljeret information om arbejdsmarkedet og arbejdsstedernes
geografiske placering, der er nødvendig for at undersøge denne teori.
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Jeg tester to formelle argumenter. Det første af disse peger på, at virksomheder foretrækker store
arbejdsmarkeder, fordi produktivitetschok har en mindre effekt på de lønninger, virksomhederne skal
betale. Hvis virksomheden er isoleret i et arbejdsmarked, vil det være sværere at udvide produktionen
i perioder, hvor det går godt, fordi virksomhedens lønninger vil stige i takt med, at virksomheden an-
sætter mere arbejdskraft. Fordelen i et arbejdsmarked med mange virksomheder er derimod, at det
er lettere for arbejdskraften at flytte mellem virksomhederne herunder fra lav- til højproduktive virk-
somheder. For virksomhederne er dette en gensidig fordel, hvis deres efterspørgsel efter arbejdskraft
ikke er perfekt korreleret. På baggrund af data over årlige ændringer i antallet af ansatte på et arbejds-
sted, udregner jeg et mål for industriens kapacitet for at udnytte denne type af arbejdskraftsmobilitet.
En alternativ teori er, at virksomheder, der er afhængig af den samme type af kompetencer, har
gavn af at hyre fra det samme lokale arbejdsmarked, da konkurrence efter human kapital øger ar-
bejdsstyrkens incitament til at investere i uddannelse. I kapitlet er kompetencer defineret ved den
højeste fuldførte uddannelse, og jeg beregner et mål for, hvor homogen industriens arbejdssteder er,
der tager højde for både uddannelsens længde og fagområde.
Den empiriske analyse viser, at industrier, der har et stort potentiale for at re-allokere arbejdskraft
mellem virksomhederne i højere grad er placeret i samme geografiske arbejdsmarked end andre in-
dustrier. Derimod er industrier, der består af virksomheder, der anvender lignende kompetencer
ikke mere geografisk lokaliserede end andre industrier. Dog peger analysen på at ensartethed i kom-
petencer er en faktor i forbindelse med at udnytte et potentiale for at re-allokere arbejdskraft mellem
virksomhederne. I en supplerende analyse finder jeg, at dette i højere grad er tilfældet, når potentialet
for at dele arbejdskraft måles i forhold til resten af fremstillingsindustrien end blandt virksomheder,
der tilhører den samme industri.
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Abstract
A prominent idea in the literature on localised knowledge spillovers is that job-mobility by
technical and scientific staff is a key source of local technology diffusion. Moreover, theoretical
work suggests that parts of the costs of industrial research and development expenditures are in-
ternalised in the labour market as workers pay for the value of R&D-learning by accepting lower
wages. I study this question for the Danish pharmaceutical industry by estimating and comparing
wage-profiles for workers at R&D-plants with otherwise similar workers at other pharmaceutical
plants. I find that male employees at R&D-active plants with a Master’s or PhD degree, in a field
relevant to pharmaceutical research, take a wage-discount of around 4-10% early in their career in
return for higher earnings later. In particular, recent R&D-experience is a source of significantly
higher wages for this group of workers. For the female part of the workforce with a Master’s or
PhD degree, the estimated coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude than for men, but statis-
tically as strong. The results for workers at R&D-plants with a medium-level technical education
are more mixed in the sense that they seem to reach the earning-levels of technical workers at
other pharmaceutical plants only late in their career. The estimates presented in this paper are
of the same magnitude as in Møen (2005) for the Norwegian machinery and equipment industry,
and the results suggest that the value of technology spillovers and R&D-learning in the pharma-
ceutical industry is at least partly internalised in the labour market.
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1 Introduction
The general view among researchers in economics is that the market under provides private invest-
ments in research and development (R&D). The argument is that the output – knowledge – is a non-
rival good that spills over to other firms, making it difficult for the investing firm to appropriate the
full return. A prominent idea in the literature on localised knowledge spillovers is that job-mobility by
scientists and engineers is a key source of local technology diffusion (since Arrow (1962)), and more-
over that parts of the costs of R&D are internalised in the labour market (Pakes and Nitzan (1983)).
Møen (2005) proposes to study this question by comparing wage-profiles for similar workers at es-
tablishments of different R&D intensity and applies this method to the Norwegian machinery and
equipment industry. In this paper, I also use this method, but, rather than looking across industries,
I suggest looking for similar effects within one of the most research intensive industries; the pharma-
ceutical industry.
The pharmaceutical industry ranks among the most R&D-intensive industries. As an example, in
the US – a world leader in pharmaceutical research – R&D in value added amounted to 44% in 2006
compared to 10% in all of manufacturing.1 For this reason, the pharmaceutical industry is a natural
as well as one of the most important industries to study in order to learn about industrial R&D.
Danish register data are useful for studying worker mobility, wages, and R&D in this sector. First,
the data set enables me to trace workers’ career trajectories and to link these to the pattern of R&D-
activity. Second, the Danish pharmaceutical industry is highly clustered with about 75 percent of
employment in the Copenhagen area. Thus, physical barriers to worker mobility are likely of limited
importance. Finally, the Danish pharmaceutical industry is highly developed and research intensive
with a ratio of R&D-expenditures to value added of around 40%.2
Human capital is an essential input into the research process, and, likewise, the scientist who de-
velops a new process or a new product naturally embodies key insights with respect to its scope and
potential for further advancements (Zucker et al. (1998)).3 This is the background for considering
worker mobility as one of the most important micro-foundations for inter-firm knowledge transfers.
An obvious way for a firm to gain access to an external knowledge base is simply to hire key scien-
tists in possession of the technological know-how of interest by offering a sufficiently high wage (see
e.g. theoretical models by Pakes and Nitzan (1983), Kim and Marschke (2005), Combes and Duran-
ton (2006)). The key point in Pakes and Nitzan (1983) is, however, that this need not affect project
1OECD STAN databases.
2OECD STAN databases.
3Zucker et al. (1998) write that knowledge possess the property of natural excludability when it is tacit and embodied in
people.
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profitability as the optimal employment contract specifies a wage-discount to scientists in the early
research phase as a "payment" for their expected, future high earnings.
A different, but complementary, perspective on the relationship between human capital and
R&D-investments is that research-intensive firms in general provide a superior learning environ-
ment compared to other firms. To undertake research is by definition associated with operating at
the technological frontier where technologies are less standardised and experimentation a necessity.
This leads to the hypothesis that employees at research-based firms are exposed to newer technolo-
gies and perform fewer routine-tasks compared to employees at the average firm translating into
faster accumulation rates of human capital in research-intensive firms.4 The work of Rosen (1972)
on workers’ willingness to pay for occupational learning implies that research-based firms can hire
young workers at a wage below their outside option.
In accordance with these arguments, the key hypothesis in this paper is that workers are aware
that participating in R&D increases their value in the labour market enabling firms to pay wages be-
low the going market wage to young workers at entry into the labour market. If this holds true, work-
ers bear part of the cost of private R&D in return for capturing part of the gains.
I seek answers to this question by studying the Danish pharmaceutical industry within the em-
pirical framework laid out in Møen (2005). The key information in the data set is yearly observations
at the individual level on wages, place of employment, and occupational information that reveals
whether workers at the plant carry out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine. I use the last
piece of information to divide plants into R&D-plants (employs at least one scientist) and non-R&D-
plants (employs no scientists).
I start by presenting descriptive statistics on the mobility patterns of workers both between R&D
and non-R&D workplaces as well as in and out of the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical R&D-
plants show a larger tendency to be connected via worker mobility to hospitals and universities than
other pharmaceutical plants.
In the main analysis, I estimate workers’ investment in and return to R&D-learning. The empirical
strategy is to divide plants into two groups according to whether or not research takes place at the
plant. By comparing wage-profiles for workers at R&D-active plants with wage-profiles for similar
workers at other plants, it is in principle possible to estimate a price on as well as a return to R&D-
learning. Also, the panel structure of the data reveals information on the career history of each worker
which allows me to separate current R&D-learning from past R&D-experience.
4The dual view on the outcome of R&D-investments originates with Cohen and Levinthal (1989). It is based on the authors’
empirical findings that firms invest in R&D not only to innovate but also to learn and thereby increase their capacity to
absorb knowledge from external sources, i.e. from universities and other firms in the sector.
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The sample that I use includes all Danish workers who have finished a formal degree providing
skills relevant to pharmaceutical research, and who were employed full-time in the Danish pharma-
ceutical industry at some point between 1995 and 2005. In addition, I form two subgroups that better
satisfy an assumption of homogeneity in worker types. The first subgroup consists of workers with a
medium-level technical education, and the second group consists of workers with a Master’s degree
or a PhD degree. I carry out the analysis separately for the two groups of workers which should, to
some extent, mitigate biases stemming from differences in unobserved worker ability. Even though
the data set is a panel, I cannot solve the problem in the usual way by employing worker fixed effects
since this approach would prevent me from estimating exactly the wage-levels that are necessary in
order to identify wage-discounts to young workers. To the extent that high-productivity workers are
more likely to work at R&D-plants, I will present conservative estimates of the wage-discount that
R&D-workers accept early in their career.
I start by considering only the male part part of the sample. I find evidence that workers with
a Master’s or PhD degree who are employed at R&D-active plants accumulate human capital at a
faster rate than workers at other types of pharmaceutical plants and receive a wage-discount early
in their career of around 4%. When I include firm fixed effects to account for selection of high-
productivity workers into high-productivity firms, the estimate increases to 7%. Separating out past
R&D-experience further increases the estimate to 10%. These are estimates of the same magnitude
as in Møen (2005).
With respect to workers with a medium-level technical education, I find that entry wages are
similar at both types of plants but that wage growth in the beginning of their career are lower at
R&D-active plants. For these workers it is only after about 25 years of experience that employment at
R&D-active plants translate into higher yearly earnings in comparison with otherwise similar workers
at other types of pharmaceutical plants. This result compares to that in Møen (2005) in the sense that
he finds that technical workers with R&D-exposure catch up to otherwise similar workers markedly
later than is the case for workers with a higher technical or scientific degree.
In the main analysis, women were left out in order to ease comparison with the results in Møen
(2005), and to ensure a larger degree of homogeneity in the sample. As women constitute more than
50% of workers with a technical or scientific degree in the total sample, it is important to investigate
whether this group shows a similar pattern in order to judge the overall impact of the effects on the
industry. Moreover, investigating the existence of a wage-discount among women is new to the lit-
erature. In the group of workers with a Master’s or PhD degree, I estimate the wage-discount to be
between 3 and 5%. Likewise, the group of female workers with a medium-level technical education
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shows a similar pattern as in the male sample, though the coefficients in these regressions are not
significantly different from zero.
Turning to the related literature, a number of studies seek to determine the existence and scope
– geographic and technological – of technology spillovers. One method is to construct an aggregate
stock of knowledge and include this measure in a knowledge production function for the firm (see
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) for a survey). A very famous analysis is by Jaffe et al. (1993) in which the
authors pioneer the use of patent citations to measure the geographic consentration of knowledge
spillovers and a recent one is by Ellison et al. (2010) who link technology flows to co-location of
pairwise US industries.
The famous case-study of the computer industries in California’s Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route
128 by Saxenian (1994) points to worker mobility as an important source of learning. According to
this study, the culture of job-shopping in Silicon Valley was important to the region’s high innova-
tion rates compared to the computer industry in Boston in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Almeida and
Kogut (1999) relates localisation of technology spillovers as measured by patent citations to mobility
patterns of engineers and key inventors and find that more intra-regional mobility is associated with
a higher localisation-effect whereas more inter-regional mobility is associated with less localisation.
Kim and Marschke (2005) find that patenting is more pronounced in industries with high mobility
rates and take this as evidence that firms patent more in these industries to protect their knowledge
base when former employees move to competitors.
Møen (2005) is first to use detailed register data to investigate the existence of technology spillovers
by looking at individual wage and career profiles of workers. The finding, that young workers in R&D
accept lower wages at entry into the labour market, suggests that these workers are indeed carriers of
technological know-how. A follow-up paper by Magnani (2006) uses R&D information at the level of
2-digit industries to study this question for the US manufacturing sector but does not find a similar
pattern. The author herself mentions that the impreciseness involved in using industry-level infor-
mation biases her estimates of the wage-discounts towards zero.
A number of related studies suggest that looking at a narrow group of professionals can be a useful
way of learning about labour market externalities. With respect to matching, Gan and Li (2004)’s
study of the academic job market for new PhDs in Economics suggests that a field with more job
openings and more candidates offers a higher probability of matching, and an often cited work on
specialisation is Baumgardner (1988) who find that physicians perform a narrower range of activities
in thick markets. Moreover, the hypothesis in the present paper is closely related to that in Stern
(2004) who uses information on job-offers to young PhD job-market candidates in Biology to show
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that these students accept a lower wage in return for better conditions to do own research. The author
interprets this finding in terms of a preference for working in research environments. The study in
the present paper is different in more than one way. It focuses on industrial R&D and covers both
technicians and people with a higher formal degree just as it looks at wage patterns across the career
of the worker.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I summarise two relevant theoretical mod-
els. Section 3 explains the data and presents some descriptive statistics on workers and firms in the
pharmaceutical industry. In section 4, I carry out a descriptive analysis of mobility patterns both
within as well as in and out of the industry. I present the empirical strategy and results in section
5, and in section 6, I present results on the sample of women. Section 7 contains some robustness
checks, and the paper ends with a conclusion in section 8.
2 Theory
In this paper, I use two concepts of on-the-job learning. One concept captures general accumulation
of skills, and is in line with the traditional concept of human capital accumulation used in the labour
market literature.
The other type of human capital that I have in mind relates to what is termed intellectual human
capital by Zucker et al. (1998). This concept captures types of knowledge that are scarce and embod-
ied in a few researchers that took part in its development. The scarcity is usually thought of as being
due to a high level of complexity and/or associated with novelty.
Intellectual human capital is by definition closely related to the R&D process of the firm whereas
ordinary human capital accumulation takes place in all jobs. However, accumulation of ordinary
human capital takes place at different rates in different types of jobs depending on the type of tasks
and the technology used. In particular, I argue that a firm undertaking R&D provides an advanced
learning environment because workers are continuously exposed to the latest developments within
their field and are required to learn and adapt to new methods more frequently.
In this section, I present two theoretical models that provide insights as to how I can expect work-
ers and firms to act in an R&D-intensive labour market. The first one is a model of occupational
learning in a competitive labour market in which different tasks have a different learning content.
The second model derives the optimal wage-contract that an entrepreneur should offer a scientist-
employee who, while working, gains access to valuable knowledge.
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2.1 Amodel of occupational learning
The theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that R&D firms can hire young workers at a
wage below their outside option. These firms provide a superior learning environment because work-
ers use the newest technologies and generally are exposed to the latest developments within their
field. Furthermore, tasks are less routine-based and requires adaptation and flexibility contributing
to the speed of human capital accumulation. Rational workers who maximise their life-time income
should be willing to pay for these superior learning opportunities. A more general version of this ar-
gument is due to Rosen (1972). The key idea is that workers learn on the job and jobs should therefore
be seen as a tied package of work and learning opportunities. Different jobs require different skills
but are also associated with different options for human capital accumulation. Based on this ob-
servation, Rosen (1972) predicts that workers move between occupations within and between firms
according to their optimal learning strategy.
According to this argument the observed wage consists of two unobserved parts. An implicit price
that the worker pays for his learning and a payment to the worker for her participation in production.
Empirically, if labour markets are competitive, one should be able to estimate an implicit price of
learning as the difference between the observed wage to a worker in a job with a high learning content
and the wage received by a similar worker in a similar occupation with less scope for learning. This
point is exactly what Møen (2005) exploits to determine whether the value of technology spillovers
are internalised in the labour market by research workers.
To clarify the argument, it is useful to sketch the key parts of Rosen’s model.
Workers are risk-neutral and the labour market is competitive. A worker employed in a job k
receives a net-wage of:
y =ωH −P(k ) (1)
where y is income, ω is the unit rental price of human capital H , and k is an index that measures
the potential for one-the-job-learning, where k ∈ [0, k¯ ]. By the hypothesis of compensating wage-
differentials, P(k ) is the market-equalizing wage-differential between a job with no learning content
and a job with learning content k . If the marginal cost of learning is positive and increasing, then
P ′(k )> 0 and P ′′(k )> 0.
Human capital evolves according to:
H˙i t =αik t (2)
where αi represents worker i ′s ability to learn such that a higher αi is associated with a higher ability
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to learn. The optimal sequence of jobs, k t , over the life-time T is the sequence which maximises the
net present value of life-time income. This is the solution to the following problem:
maxwr t kt V =
∫ T
0
[ωHt −P(k t )]e−r t d t (3)
subject to an initial value of human capitalH0 and where the level of human capital evolves according
to (2). The optimal solution requires that at any time t ∈ [0,T ]:
P ′(k t )
αi
=
ω
r
[1− e−r (T−t )] (4)
This expression says that workers move between jobs with different learning contents such that the
marginal cost of accumulating human capital equals the discounted marginal return associated with
future earning opportunities. In line with human capital theory, equation (4) also shows that workers
prefer jobs with a high learning content early in their career but over time gradually move to job-types
with less scope for learning.
It is clear from equation (4) that the marginal cost of learning (the left-hand side) decreases with
the ability to learn, αi . Thus, more able workers will self-select into jobs with a higher learning poten-
tial. Accordingly, if αi differs across workers, the rate of accumulation of human capital that workers
at R&D-active plants experience, is not the rate that workers in genereal would experience at R&D-
active plants. I return to this issue in the results section.
2.2 Amodel of labourmobility and technological spillovers
In contrast to the Rosen (1972) model, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) consider the case in which knowledge
is scarce and innovations lead to market power. This captures a labour market in which highly skilled
staff employed to carry out R&D embody essential information about new technologies and produc-
tion methods providing them with bargaining power in the wage-setting process as firms compete
for their skills and knowledge.
The authors consider a two-period game in which an entrepreneur in the first period hires a re-
searcher to carry out research and if successful sells the product in the product market in the second
period. The researcher is free to leave the entrepreneur in the second period either to join a competi-
tor or to create a spin-off firm. In both cases, he can use the knowledge of the new product to produce
the good and the two firms compete. The key-insight from the Pakes and Nitzan (1983) model is that
the optimal two-part wage contract enables the entrepreneur to appropriate the full return to his
investment.5 The contract consists of a second-period wage that depends on second period profits
5This result assumes risk-neutral workers and no borrowing constraints or lower limits on wages. These are factors that
limit the extent to which the firm can appropriate the full return.
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and first-period fixed wage that exactly satisfies the researcher’s participation constraint. This lets the
entrepreneur subtract the equivalent of the high second-period earnings from the first-period wage.6
2.3 Empirical predictions
Both theories imply similar predictions with respect to the wage-profiles of R&D-workers. Rational
workers are willing to accept a wage below their current market-value because they see an initial job
in R&D as an investment in future earning-opportunities. Based on this logic, I expect on average
to observe lower initial wages but steeper earning-profiles for pharmaceutical workers who choose a
research career compared to otherwise similar workers at other types of pharmaceutical plants.7
As both of the above-mentioned theories lay emphasis on mobility - between occupations and/or
between firms - it is natural to look for support of the theories in the mobility patterns of workers.
However, it does not follow from the models that we should necessarily observe mobility between
firms in equilibrium. In the Pakes and Nitzan (1983) model, a researcher only changes employer
when it is efficient8, and in the Rosen (1972) model some workers realise their optimal learning path
by changing occupation within the firm. Therefore, it is difficult to come up with a good test of the
theories based on the mobility pattern of workers.
3 Data and empirical strategy
For the empirical analysis, I use the Integrated Data Base (IDA) for Labor Market Research provided
by Statistics Denmark. This is a matched employer-employee data set beginning in 1980 that contains
detailed register-based demographic and labour market information for all individuals with Danish
residence. For this analysis, the relevant variables are the very detailed information on income, expe-
rience, occupation, place of work, and the type and length of formal education.
6Other contributions building on this idea include Fosfuri and Rønde (2004) who consider the case where knowledge is
cumulative and Kim and Marschke (2005) who allow firms to protect their knowledge-base by the use of patents.
7A priori, it is possible to distinguish empirically between the two theories. The Rosen (1972) theory emphasises learning
in a traditional sense whereas Pakes and Nitzan (1983) assume that workers earn a return on the information about the
latest innovations within their field before this knowledge becomes standardised and available to a larger community of
researchers. As argued in Møen (2005), it is therefore natural to think that the value of knowledge depreciates faster if the
Pakes and Nitzan (1983) framework is important whereas if researchers benefit from traditional learning rather than from
their access to a scarce knowledge resource we should observe lower depreciation rates in the data. Thus, if intellectual
human capital matters most it should only be recently accumulated human capital in research firms that have value in the
labour market. The caveat is that it requires a lot from the data for this to be feasible. It requires precise information about
the research exposure for each worker throughout the career at all of his employers. Even though I have access to a rich
data set and though I am able to calculate a measure of previous research experience, the information that I have is not
adequate for using depreciation rates to distinguish the two theories.
8It requires a threat of entry by a third party for mobility to take place. In this case it can be optimal for the entrepreneur
to induce the researcher to leave and start on his own such that the third firm expects tougher competition and chooses to
stay out of the market.
23
Information about individual research exposure is of key importance. Unfortunately, the data
contain no information on R&D-expenditures by firms and least of all by individual plants. However,
the labour market data contain detailed information on the occupation of workers and this enables
me to identify pharmaceutical research. Companies in Denmark are required to report to Statis-
tics Denmark a 6-digit code which states the occupation of each of its employees in the last week of
November each year. The codes give the hierarchical position of the employee as well as a descrip-
tion of the type of task performed by the worker. Of relevance specifically to the present analysis of
the pharmaceutical industry (NACE: 2441 and 2442), companies are asked to identify workers that
carry out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine. I use this information to identify R&D-active
plants.9
To be specific, I define an R&D-plant as a workplace at which the company states that at least one
employee carries out scientific work in pharmaceuticals. I then define a research exposed worker by
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the worker is employed at an R&D-active plant and 0
otherwise. This is a restrictive definition as it implies that workers are distinguished by the inten-
sity of research exposure neither across R&D-active plants nor within R&D-active plants. Thus, a key
assumption is that all workers for which my R&D-indicator is 1 are exposed to a similar amount of re-
search. Clearly, this assumption does not hold in general for a broad sample of workers at a plant. In
the analysis, I limit the sample to workers with a technical or scientific degree at the vocational level
or above.10 Furthermore, I distinguish between two groups of workers: 1) workers with a medium-
level technical education (workers with a vocational or Bachelor’s degree)11 and 2) employees with a
Master’s or PhD degree. I carry out the analysis separately for these two groups. By selecting the sam-
ple according to relevant educations, I seek to restrict the analysis to workers that carry out similar
tasks at the plant and accordingly have similar exposure to R&D-activities. Likewise, these individuals
are the workers for which the empirical effects of interest are likely to be most relevant.
Since, the occupational codes are only available from 1995 and educational information end in
2005, the analysis is restricted to the years 1995-2005.
I have considered the option of calculating a continuous measure of R&D-intensity as the share
of workers that carry out scientific work in pharmaceuticals relative to either the total number of
employees or to the total number of employees with a relevant education. The disadvantage with
9Unfortunately, the occupation variable does not contain an equivalent definition for workers that carry out scientific work
in other industries.
10These are workers that I judge have an education relevant to pharmaceutical research. It is a broad definition as it for
examples include all types of engineers, but I prefer this simple approach rather than risk losing important worker types by
for example only selecting educations that are designed specifically for the pharmaceutical sector.
11Vocational education corresponds to the final stage of a secondary education. For example laboratory technicians are
included in this group. I will sometimes refer to the group of workers with a medium-level education as technical employees
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such a measure is that it is less robust towards errors in the classification of workers into occupational
groups. Moreover, it is not clear that such a measure more adequately captures actual R&D-exposure
of the worker. Instead, to account for variations in human capital intensity across plants which might
interact with the intensity of research, I include the share of low-skilled workers at the workplace12. In
this way, I also take into account that some R&D-active plants are also traditional production plants.13
The advantage with the present data set is that it allows me to define R&D at the plant-level which
is very useful in this study that is concerned with a narrowly defined sector. In studies that rely on
R&D-exposure to account for research-intensity, information is usually at the level of the firm. Fur-
thermore, for each year I know the (anonymised) place of work for each individual which enables me
to trace the recent career trajectories of workers (from 1995) and consider their past research experi-
ence.
In the main analysis, I restrict the sample to male, full-time workers. This I do primarily to ease
comparison with Møen (2005), but also because the labour market experiences of women are likely
to be different from those of men which would affect the cross-comparison of individuals’ human
capital accumulation. Finally, I exclude part-time workers, and I exclude workers who are employed
at plants with less than five employees. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for this sample. As female
workers constitute more than 50% of the workforce in both groups of workers considered in this pa-
per14, it is nonetheless highly relevant to learn about the wage-schedules of this group also, and in
section 6, I present results on this part of the workforce.
12The cut-off that I use is a formal vocational degree corresponding to final stage of secondary education (ISCED definition).
Thus, a fraction of the workers actually possess formal qualifications at the medium-level.
13Møen (2005) uses both a continuous R&D measure as well as uses a dummy-definition dividing firms into those with low
R&D-intensity and high R&D-intensity to make the distinction between plant types clearer.
14In the group of workers with a technical degree women actually constitute around 70% of the workforce. In the group of
workers with Master’s or PhD degree the equivalent number is 50 %.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Workers by education and R&D-type
Mean SD P10 P90
Medium-level technical education
At R&D-active plant (6012 obs.):
Share with BA 0.40 0.49 0 1
Years of experience 15.3 8.6 5.1 28.0
Wage in 2000 DKK 400.000 175.000 237.000 595.000
Size of plant (workers) 1323 964 176 2982
Share of low-skilled 0.61 0.07 0.53 0.72
At non-R&D plant (4857 obs.):
Share with BA 0.50 0.50 0 1
Years of experience 14.8 8.3 5.0 27.1
Wage in 2000 DKK 408.000 159.000 245.000 602.000
Size of plant (workers) 975 936 59 2253
Share of low-skilled 0.71 0.12 0.50 0.85
Master’s or PhD degree:
At R&D-active plant (8574 obs.):
Share with PhD 0.22 0.41 0 1
Years of experience 14.2 9.2 3.7 28
Wage in 2000 DKK 578.000 359.000 335.000 702.000
Size of plant (workers) 1448 967 322 3321
Share of low-skilled 0.60 0.07 0.53 0.70
At non-R&D plant (4316 obs.):
Share with PhD 0.19 0.39 0 1
Years of experience 13.4 8.7 3.4 26,0
Wage in 2000 DKK 533.000 242.000 327.000 757.000
Size of plant (workers) 1156 1054 59 3208
Share of low-skilled 0.66 0.13 0.49 0.81
Note The data set contains worker-year observations of men with respectively a medium-level
technical education, or Master’s or PhD degree who are employed full-time in the Danish phar-
maceutical industry 1995-2005. Workers with a technical education and total yearly wage-
income below 100.000 (DKK 2000) and workers with a Master’s or PhD degree and total yearly
wage-income below 150.000 (DKK 2000) are excluded. These are approximately the 5th per-
centiles for workers with less than 5 years of experience in each group. Likewise, workers at
plants with less than 5 employees are left out of the sample. An R&D-active plant is a plant
that reports that at least one worker carries out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine.
DKK:Danish Kroner. Wage is rounded to nearest 1000.
My measure of wages is nominal total, annual, wage income. Thus, I do not distinguish between
workers that have one and two employers.15
Even though, I construct a sample of full-time workers, it is possible that some of these individuals
at an earlier point in their career did not work or worked part-time. I wish to control for this in the
measure of experience. The experience variable is a measure of actual experience obtained by being
a wage-earner in Denmark. In Denmark, it is compulsory for all workers to make payments to a
15For these high-skilled individuals one could think that controlling for hours of work is important when comparing work-
ers. However, the data does not include information on hours worked above 37 hours of work per week. To the extent that
working long hours is associated with specific company culture, I control for this when I include firm-fixed effects.
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compulsory pension scheme, ATP. These payments depend on number of hours employed during the
week or month and are registered for all individuals employed as wage-earner back to 1964. Thus by
using the ATP-payments Statistics Denmark construct a rather precise measure of work-experience.16
3.1 Industry description
The most striking feature of the Danish pharmaceutical industry is that it is is highly geographically
concentrated with about 75% of employment in the Copenhagen area. The industry consists of a few
major firms and a number of smaller firms consisting of 1-3 plants. In the sample years, the number
of plants in the industry varies between 63 and 71 plants. The total number of workers increases from
around 12,000 in 1995 to 17,000 in 2005 whereas the total number of firms declines from 47 to 36.
Most variables in the analysis are information about individual workers, but I control for plant size
and the share of low-skilled workers. Plant-level descriptive statistics are reported in table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Danish pharmaceutical
plants by R&D-type
Mean SD P10 P90
R&D-active plants(174):
Number of employees 518 683 42 1266
Share of low-skilled 0.62 0.12 0.50 0.75
Non-R&D active plants (549):
Number of employees 122 333 7 226
Share of low-skilled 0.73 0.20 0.43 0.92
Note The data set includes all Danish pharmaceutical plants (NACE: 2441 and
2442), years 1995-2005. An R&D-active plant is a plant that reports that at
least one worker carries out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine.
As expected R&D-performing plants are larger than other plants. Even though these plants also
employ a lower share of low-skilled workers, the numbers in the table indicates that at some plants
both R&D and production is likely to take place.
4 Mobility
The following section provides an account of the mobility patterns of male workers in the pharma-
ceutical industry who hold an exam of relevance to pharmaceutical research. Both within the phar-
maceutical sector and in/out of other industries. It is a purely descriptive analysis but is a useful
background for the subsequent estimation results.
16Unfortunately, it is not until recently that self-employed made these payment. Thus for workers who have been self-
employed for a number of years, I underestimate their experience-level. This might bias my results if their are more of this
type of workers at either of the two types of plants.
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I start by considering mobility within the industry, see table 3. Part A of the table shows all changes
in worker-types (R&D or non-R&D). Some of these changes is not a result of an actual move but occurs
due to a change of workplace type. Part B shows the changes in worker types that are due to actual
moves between plant types. This part of the table shows that the vast amount of mobility takes place
between plants with same R&D-status. This amounts to approximately 95% of all actual moves.
The theories in section 2 predict that if workers change plant-type, they will move from R&D-
active plants to non-R&D active plants as they move from jobs with a high learning content to jobs
with a lower learning content. The table, however, does not confirm this prediction. An explana-
tion might be that the skills and know-how learned at R&D-workplaces is difficult to transfer to non-
R&D environments. Moreover, the numbers do not reveal whether "R&D-stayers" actually move from
highly research intensive plants to plants that carry out R&D but with less intensity just at it does not
reveal occupational mobility of similar type within the same workplace.
Table 3: Mobility between R&D-active and non-R&D active plants
A: all changes B: changes due to
actual moves
R&D(t) non-R&D(t) total R&D(t) non-R&D(t) total
row-percentages row-percentages
Master’s or PhD degree:
R&D(t-1) 84.3 15.7 6880 96.5 3.5 6010
Non-R&D(t-1) 31.7 68.3 3599 7.8 92.2 2665
Medium-level technical education:
R&D(t-1) 81.7 18.3 4912 95.8 4.15 4188
Non-R&D(t-1) 22.3 77.7 3873 4.5 95.9 3149
Note Mobility patterns for the male part of the sample. Part A of the table does not distinguish between changes in worker type
that are due to a move between workplaces and changes that occur because the workplace changes type. Part B of the table
excludes all changes in worker types that are due to a workplace changing R&D-status. An R&D-active plant is a plant that
reports that at least one worker carries out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine.
The empirical strategy assumes that workers choose between employment at an R&D-active phar-
maceutical plant or at an non-R&D active pharmaceutical plant. Of course in reality workers have
the option of moving to other industries. In particular, industries such as hospitals, universities and
chemicals are natural alternative employment options for most pharmaceutical workers.
Table 4 provides an overview of these mobility patterns. The numbers show that it is only a small
fraction of workers that move in and out of the sector. In the pooled sample of male workers with a
medium-level technical or Master’s or PhD degree, total mobility in and out of the sector amounts to
28% of workers. The table shows how inflows and outflows are distributed across the industries that
constitute the most important alternative employment options for workers in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Also, the table distinguishes between R&D-plants and other plants. R&D-active plants show
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a larger tendency to be linked via worker mobility to hospitals and universities – i.e. research active
workplaces – whereas the plants without R&D-activity to a larger degree are linked with the chem-
ical industry, precision and optical equipment and the residual group of industries in the category
"other".
Table 4: Mobility in and out of the pharmaceutical sector
R&D-active plant Non R&D-plant
inflow outflow inflow outflow
Chemicals and Chemical products 20.8 25.6 25.2 25.2
Precision and optical instruments 1.8 1.4 3.5 2.1
Hospitals etc. 6.2 3.6 2.4 0.9
Universities, research and teaching 19.2 11.3 9.3 6.8
Pharmacies and retail sale of medical equipment 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.4
Other 50.4 57.4 60.1 64.5
Total moves in sample 2011 1623 1670 1384
Note Mobility patterns for the male part of the sample. The chemical industry: NACE 24 excluding 24.4 (pharmaceuticals);
Precision and optical instruments etc. NACE: 33; Hospitals etc.: NACE 8511, 8512, 8513, 8520; Universities, research,
and teaching: NACE 7310, 8030; Pharmacies and retail sale of medical equipment: NACE 5231, 5232. An R&D-active
plant is a plant that reports that at least one worker carries out scientific work in bio-technology or medicine.
5 Empirical results
This section presents estimates of the degree to which workers at R&D-plants pay for learning by
accepting a wage-discount early in their career in exchange for subsequent higher wages. I start by
using R&D-exposure at time t and its interaction with experience as the only R&D variables. This
amounts to using current R&D-exposure as a proxy for career R&D, which is a good approximation if
workers choose either research careers or careers at other types of pharmaceutical plants. As the pre-
vious section showed there is a large amount of stability in worker R&D-types but also some mobility,
and in the following subsection, I use the panel-dimension of the data set to construct a separate
index of the workers previous R&D-experience.
5.1 Current R&D as a proxy of for career R&D
The baseline regression is an extended mincerian wage-regression of the following form performed
on the pooled data set:
l og wa g e i t =α0 +α1s chool in g i t +α2expe r i ence i t +α3expe r i ence 2i t
+δ0CRDi t +δ1CRDi t ∗ expe r i ence i t +δ2CRDi t ∗ expe r i ence 2i t
+Zi tβ
+u i t (5)
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The unit of analysis is worker i at time t , and the dependent variable of the earnings function is the log
of yearly wage-income. I control for years of schooling and experience, and I include time dummies
and a quadratic in plant-level number of employees as well as the share of low-skilled workers in the
vector Zi t . The parameters of interest are δ0, δ1 and δ2. CRD is a dummy variable that takes on the
value 1 if worker i at time t is employed at an R&D-active plant.
The expected sign on δ0 is negative. The parameter captures the willingness to pay for learning
in a research environment for a young worker at the beginning of his career. Over the years the value
of learning diminishes as the worker has fewer years left in the labour market to benefit from further
accumulation of human capital, and at the same time the worker capitalises on past accumulated
research experience. Accordingly, I expect the early wage-discount gradually to turn into a wage-
premium at later stages of the career and therefore to observe faster wage growth for workers at R&D-
active plants. This implies a positive expected sign on δ1. The interaction between the R&D dummy
and experience2 allows the effect to differ across age-groups and for the rate of depreciation of human
capital to differ between research experience and experience from plants that are not R&D-active.
I run the regression separately on the group of workers with a medium-level technical education
and the group of workers with a Master’s or PhD degree, respectively. The two groups of workers
carry out different tasks and enter the labour market with a different set of skills, and I wish to allow
for human capital accumulation and labour market effects to differ across the two groups of workers.
Table 5 shows the results. Column 1 and 3 show the baseline regression, and in column 2 and 4, I have
included firm-fixed effects.
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Table 5: The effect of R&D-experience on earnings
Medium-level Master’s or
technical education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.0437 -0.0022 -0.1311*** -0.2008***
(0.0270) (0.0358) (0.0315) (0.0741)
Employees (1000) -0.0283*** 0.0019 -0.0124 -0.0216
(0.0091) (0.0252) (0.0108) (0.0240)
Employees (1000)2 0.0132*** 0.0027 0.0114*** 0.0150**
(0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0030) (0.0063)
Bachelor’s degree 0.3608*** 0.3629***
(0.0052) (0.0167)
PhD degree 0.0224*** 0.0260
(0.0060) (0.0158)
Experience 0.0364*** 0.0354*** 0.0500*** 0.0492***
(0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0021) (0.0035)
Experience2 -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R&D-dummy (CRD) -0.0031 0.0207 -0.0373** -0.0712**
(0.0209) (0.0374) (0.0182) (0.0299)
Experience × CRD -0.0047* -0.0047 0.0023 0.0031
(0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0026) (0.0034)
Experience2× CRD 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 12.2003*** 12.1501*** 12.6466*** 12.7030***
(0.0283) (0.0550) (0.0302) (0.0520)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 10869 10869 12890 12890
R2 0.463 0.301
Within-R2 0.435 0.295
Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1995-2005. Time-dummies included 1996-
2005. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
For the group of workers with a Master’s or PhD degree, the coefficient on the R&D-dummy is
negative and significant at the 5%-level. Consistent with the theory, the empirical results show that
these workers on average earn 3.7% (column 3) less when they enter the labour market if their first
job is at an R&D-active plant. The interactions with experience does not come out significant, but the
parameters suggest that R&D-experience generates a slightly higher wage-growth and a lower rate of
depreciation of human capital. According to these estimates, an R&D-worker with a Master’s or PhD
degree earns a 4.4% higher wage at the end of his career (35 years of experience). These numbers are
comparable in size to those estimated in Møen (2005). Moreover, part (a) of figure 1 illustrates that
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the wage curves cross at around 15-16 years of experience which is in line with the similar example
in the article by Møen (2005).17
For workers with a medium-level technical education, the results reported in column 1 also indi-
cate that earnings develop differently over time for workers at R&D-active plants compared to work-
ers at other plants. Though, the R&D-dummy is very close to zero, the interactions with the experi-
ence terms suggest that wages in the beginning of the career grow more slowly for workers at R&D-
plants than at other plants, but also that wage growth later in the career is higher, resulting in higher
wages at the end of the career. How the wages develop over the career of workers is illustrated in part
(a) of figure 2. It is in line with the results reported in Møen (2005) that the curves cross rather late
compared to the wage curves of workers with a longer education. In both that and the present paper,
the curves cross at around 25 years of experience.
 
(a) No firm effects
 
(b) With firm effects included
Figure 1: Wage profiles: Workers with Master’s or PhD degree
 
(a) No firm effects
 
(b) With firm effects included
Figure 2: Wage profiles: Workers with medium-level technical education
17Here, I refer to the example in Møen (2005) in which the author makes a graphical comparison of wage-curves for workers
at plants with an R&D-intensity of 0.2 with those of workers at plants with an R&D-intensity of 0. R&D-intensity is measured
as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Firms use management strategies, hiring practices, and reward structures differently to attract
and retain the best workers.18 The aim of this paper is exactly to show that the payment structure at
R&D-plants are different from that at other plants, but if R&D-plants in general belong to firms that
are better at attracting high-productivity workers it makes the pooled sample of non-R&D workers
an inaccurate comparison group. In particular, I would expect that R&D-workers would earn higher
wages at a non-R&D-plant than what I observe among the pooled sample of non-R&D workers. To
address this problem, I run the regressions including firm-fixed effects. These results are shown in
columns 2 and 4 of table 5.
Now, the coefficient on the R&D-dummy is estimated by comparing workers within the same
firm but with different R&D-status. The non-R&D workers within the same firm should provide a
more accurate comparison group than all R&D-workers in the sample increasing the magnitude of
the wage-discount. For workers with Master’s or PhD degree, this is exactly the case as the coefficient
decreases from -0.04 to -0.07. For workers with a medium-level technical education, the coefficient
on the R&D-dummy turns positive, but the interactions with experience show a similar patterns as
before, though in this regression all of the coefficients are insignificant. Part (b) of figure 2 shows how
wages of this group of workers develop throughout the career.
Unfortunately, I am not able to address the general problem with worker heterogeneity in a sim-
ilar way since in order to estimate the wage-discount it is necessary to estimate the regressions in
levels. If workers differ in their general productivity levels, and this difference is systematically and
positively related to R&D employment (also within the same firm), workers at R&D-active plants are,
on average, more productive than other workers. Therefore, using non-R&D workers to estimate their
alternative wage-profile lead me to underestimate the wage-discount early in their career.
A different source of bias is heterogeneity in workers’ innate ability to learn. Rosen (1972) explic-
itly distinguishes between the learning potential associated with an occupation and the individual
worker’s ability to learn. In the model, better learners select into better learning environments. For
my analysis this implies that I expect to find the better learners employed at the R&D-active plants.
The implication of this is that I underestimate the steepness of the R&D-workers’ alternative wage-
profile by using wage-profiles of other pharmaceutical workers. Unfortunately, there is not much that
I can do about this problem besides having it in mind when I interpret my results.19
Finally, I briefly discuss the estimated coefficients on the control variables. The plant-level control
18See e.g. the empirical work of Andersson et al. (2009).
19Of course it is a possibility that other types of learning are driving the results. For example, if a successful management
career requires that workers early in their career invest heavily in acquiring managements skills of various kinds and are
willing to take wage-discounts to be employed in occupations where they develop such skills. However, this is a problem
to my estimation-strategy only if such learning is correlated with being employed at an R&D-active plant.
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variables have the expected effects on wages. The coefficient on the share of low-skilled is negative
in particular for workers with a Master’s or PhD degree. This variable is included to take into account
that production workers at plants with both production and R&D-facilities are characterised as R&D-
workers. Running the regressions without the variable ’share of low-skilled’ makes the coefficient on
the R&D-dummy less negative for workers with a longer degree. This reflects that if I only rely on
the R&D-dummy to characterise the R&D-intensity of plants, I will overestimate the R&D-intensity
of some workers.
As expected there is a large-plant wage premium and a positive effect of longer schooling and
higher experience on wages. Workers with a Bachelor’s degree have a markedly higher wage-level
than technical workers with shorter education. For this reason, I tried running the regression on
workers with a Bachelors degree separately, but this did not alter the results. In this regression, the
coefficient on the R&D-dummy is 0.03.
For both group of workers, including firm-fixed effects has a similar effect on the other plant-
level variables – share of low-skilled and plant-size – as on the R&D-variables. For workers with a
Master’s or PhD degree, the effect of these variables becomes stronger whereas for workers with a
medium-level technical education, these plant-level variables do not have an impact on wages when
one compares workers within the same firm.
5.2 Separating accumulated R&D-experience from current learning
As employment at an R&D-plant at time t is correlated with R&D-status earlier in the career, the
δ-coefficients in the above analysis capture both the average worker’s willingness to pay for current
research exposure and the return to accumulated experience from R&D-plants. Moreover, failing to
take into account changes over time in worker R&D-types biases the results. According to the hypoth-
esis of this paper, workers who switch from research plants to non-research plants have on average
accumulated more human capital and have a higher productivity than their new colleagues which
increases my estimate of accumulated human capital at these plants. On the other hand, workers
who switch in the opposite direction have a lower productivity than other workers at research plants
which decreases my estimate of their human capital. When I for a given experience level compare
workers at the two different types of plants to learn about how much more human capital is accumu-
lated at research plants, I underestimate the difference.20
This section presents results in which I use the panel-structure of the data to separate current
20Note, that the same type of bias arises if my definition of R&D-plants do not capture all plants at which R&D is carried
out. This leads me to overestimate average human capital in the group of traditional plants. Likewise, plants that change
status but not employees give rise to a similar bias.
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R&D-exposure from past R&D-exposure. The key assumption of this paper is that one year of accu-
mulated experience at an R&D-active plant is worth more in the labour market than a year of expe-
rience at a traditional pharmaceutical production plant. This implies that the expected sign on the
coefficient on previous R&D-experience is positive whereas, I expect the sign on current R&D to stay
negative and to increase in magnitude as it now only captures the value of learning to the worker.
I consider two alternative assumptions regarding the impact of previous R&D-experience on learn-
ing. In table 6, I assume that only the most recent R&D-experience is of extra value to the worker, and
I report the results of a regression in which I have included the average of the R&D dummy over the
latest three years. For observations with only one or two lagged values, the measure is the average
over the observed past experience in the pharmaceutical sector. This assumption is closest in spirit
to the Pakes and Nitzan (1983) type of models. In these models, knowledge about novel innovations
is the key component of R&D-learning, and if this a good description of the nature of R&D-learning
then R&D human capital depreciates fast and only the recent R&D-history matters. I restrict the sam-
ple to the years 1998-2005 in order to have at least three years of R&D-information for all workers.
The alternative hypothesis is that R&D-learning consists of on-the-job-learning in a more tradi-
tional sense, but that human capital accumulation takes place at a faster rate due to the experimen-
tation and efforts associated with operating on the technological frontier inherent in R&D-activities.
In this case, the pattern of depreciation of accumulated skills and know-how is expected to be more
in line with other types of human capital accumulated on the job.
Table 7 reports the results of regressions assuming that the main part of R&D-learning takes
this form. Previous R&D at time t is the average over current R&D in all previous years for which
I have R&D-information available (since 1995). I assume that this measure proxies the average R&D-
exposure of the worker and multiply it with his work experience to arrive at a measure of his total
R&D-experience. The squared experience term allows for depreciation. Finally, I again restrict the
sample to the years 1998-2005 such that I have at least three years of information available for work-
ers with long experience.21
21Since, the measure is imprecise for workers moving into the pharmaceutical sector late in the career, I have tried including
a dummy-variable taking the value of 1 for new pharmaceutical workers with more than 10 years experience. This variable
is highly negative, and it lowers the absolute value of the R&D-variables in table 7 slightly though it does change the sign
or significance level. Though in the alternative specification – assuming that R&D-learning depreciates fast – this kind of
inaccuracy should be less of a problem, a parallel exercise produce similar conclusions.
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Table 6: Effect of current R&D-experience and recent R&D-experience on
earnings
Medium-level Master’s or
technical education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.0573* 0.0204 -0.1537*** -0.2291***
(0.0308) (0.0412) (0.0356) (0.0640)
Employees (1000) -0.0254** 0.0066 -0.0138 -0.0229
(0.0100) (0.0268) (0.0124) (0.0359)
Employees (1000)2 0.0120*** 0.0013 0.0112*** 0.0157*
(0.0030) (0.0064) (0.0035) (0.0090)
Bachelor’s degree 0.3604*** 0.3629***
(0.0058) (0.0180)
PhD degree 0.0273*** 0.0303*
(0.0068) (0.0164)
Experience 0.0332*** 0.0325*** 0.0485*** 0.0484***
(0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0026) (0.0045)
Experience2 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
RD-dummy (CRD) -0.0445* -0.0052 -0.0714*** -0.1029**
(0.0242) (0.0467) (0.0215) (0.0389)
Experience× CRD -0.0026 -0.0037 0.0040 0.0046
(0.0029) (0.0056) (0.0031) (0.0049)
Experience2× CRD 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Last 3 years R&D 0.0312*** 0.0503** 0.0448*** 0.0235
(0.0081) (0.0201) (0.0090) (0.0248)
Constant 12.2611*** 12.1752*** 12.6797*** 12.7552***
(0.0306) (0.0505) (0.0328) (0.0402)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 8742 8742 10153 10153
R2 0.478 0.318
Within-R2 0.453 0.308
Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1998-2005. Time-dummies included
1999-2005. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Starting with workers with a Master’s or PhD degree, it is seen that including the two alterna-
tive types of measures of previous R&D-experience has a similar impact on the coefficient on cur-
rent R&D. In line with expectations, the coefficient on the current R&D-dummy stays negative and
increases in magnitude both with and without firm-fixed effects. For workers with a medium-level
technical education, the overall picture is likewise that the estimates of the wage-discount increase in
magnitude though the tendency is not as strong as for workers with a longer education. In particular,
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in the fixed-effects regressions the R&D-variables remain without explanatory power.
Table 7: Effect of current R&D-experience and previous R&D-experience
on earnings
Medium-level Master’s or
technical education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.0596* 0.0137 -0.1548*** -0.2411***
(0.0309) (0.0383) (0.0359) (0.0649)
Employees (1000) -0.0247** 0.0022 -0.0154 -0.0266
(0.0099) (0.0272) (0.0125) (0.0336)
Employees (1000)2 0.0119*** 0.0026 0.0118*** 0.0167**
(0.0029) (0.0066) (0.0035) (0.0082)
Bachelor’s degree 0.3612*** 0.3638***
(0.0058) (0.0190)
PhD degree 0.0273*** 0.0302*
(0.0068) (0.0164)
Experience 0.0336*** 0.0327*** 0.0473*** 0.0484***
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0049)
Experience2 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
RD-dummy (CRD) -0.0392* 0.0004 -0.0518** -0.0970***
(0.0232) (0.0429) (0.0211) (0.0354)
Experience × CRD -0.0022 -0.0036 0.0019 0.0043
(0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0045)
Experience2× CRD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience× PRD 0.0019 0.0037 0.0057*** 0.0012
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0026)
Experience2× PRD -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 12.3190*** 12.2429*** 12.7449*** 12.8245***
(0.0302) (0.0473) (0.0327) (0.0370)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 8636 8636 10153 10153
R2 0.442 0.282
Within-R2 0.428 0.281
Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1998-2005. Time-dummies included
1999-2005. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
An important assumption of the theoretical foundation for this paper is that R&D-workers expe-
rience higher earnings growth that other workers. The estimations in the previous section did not
produce very strong conclusions along these lines, though for workers with a Master’s or PhD de-
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gree signs and magnitudes on the interactions between R&D and the experience terms were in line
with the predictions. In that section, the R&D dummy in addition to capturing current R&D-status
might also capture the value of accumulated R&D-experience for a worker with a given experience
level. The estimations in the present section in which I have attempted to separately measure cur-
rent and past R&D-exposure, seem to better capture gains from R&D-experience, specifically using
the measure of recent R&D-exposure as in table 6. Though for workers with a Master’s or PhD degree,
including firm effects weakens the evidence of significant wage-gains.22
6 Sample of women
The analysis so far has been concerned with a specific group of workers in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry; male workers with either a medium-level technical degree, or a Master’s or PhD degree. In
this section, I investigate if female workers belonging to these two educational groups have similar
wage-patterns. This group of workers constitutes more than 50% of the workforce among workers
with these types of educations and are thus an important group to the industry.
Table 8 uses the sample of female workers in the regression in which current R&D is the only R&D-
information. Again, there is evidence that workers with a Master’s or PhD degree accept lower wages
early in their career. I find that these workers accept a wage-discount of 4% increasing to 5% with
firm-fixed effects included. Both estimates are significant at the 5%-level. Moreover, the coefficient
on the R&D-dummy for female workers with a medium-level technical education is more negative
than in the sample of male workers, though also not significant.
22Observing a wage-discount but no wage-gain from R&D-experience is in fact more in line with the hypothesis in Stern
(2004). He finds that young PhD job-market candidates accept lower wages in positions with better conditions for research
and interprets this as a preference for research.
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Table 8: The effect of R&D-experience on earnings, sample of women
Medium-level Master’s or
technical education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.0505*** -0.0422 -0.1059*** -0.1117**
(0.0181) (0.0676) (0.0252) (0.0430)
Employees (1000) 0.0052 0.0497*** 0.0160** 0.0010
(0.0054) (0.0111) (0.0073) (0.0130)
Employees (1000)2 0.0037** -0.0102*** 0.0023 0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0031)
Bachelor’s degree 0.1818*** 0.1762***
(0.0040) (0.0176)
PhD degree 0.0602*** 0.0666***
(0.0056) (0.0089)
Experience 0.0239*** 0.0225*** 0.0462*** 0.0466***
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0008***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R&D-dummy (CRD) -0.0191 -0.0309 -0.0317** -0.0481**
(0.0118) (0.0234) (0.0124) (0.0201)
Experience × CRD -0.0016 -0.0011 0.0028 0.0023
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Experience2× CRD 0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 12.1605*** 12.1399*** 12.5173*** 12.5350***
(0.0180) (0.0560) (0.0241) (0.0397)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 25300 25300 13721 13721
R2 0.340 0.469
Within-R2 0.283 0.455
Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1995-2005. Time-dummies included 1996-
2005. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
In table 9, I report the results with recent R&D-experience included. Again, this table confirms the
results of the previous section. To save on space, I do not report the regressions with the alternative
measure of R&D-experience as these regressions do not alter the conclusions.
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Table 9: The effect of recent R&D-experience on earnings, sample of
women
Medium-level Master’s or
technical education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.0586*** -0.0619 -0.0956*** -0.1435**
(0.0214) (0.0600) (0.0285) (0.0565)
Employees (1000) 0.0118* 0.0573*** 0.0147* 0.0059
(0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0081) (0.0136)
Employees (1000)2 0.0009 -0.0128*** 0.0021 0.0029
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0032)
Bachelor’s degree 0.1883*** 0.1844***
(0.0045) (0.0209)
PhD degree 0.0646*** 0.0708***
(0.0061) (0.0084)
Experience 0.0224*** 0.0215*** 0.0458*** 0.0460***
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0014)
Experience2 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0008***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
RD-dummy (CRD) -0.0458*** -0.0428 -0.0502*** -0.0672***
(0.0142) (0.0307) (0.0151) (0.0185)
Experience× CRD -0.0015 -0.0011 0.0023 0.0023
(0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0017)
Experience2× CRD 0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Last 3 years R&D 0.0255*** 0.0154*** 0.0317*** 0.0144**
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0069)
Constant 12.2074*** 12.1845*** 12.5025*** 12.5605***
(0.0205) (0.0448) (0.0265) (0.0447)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 20003 20003 11224 11224
R2 0.376 0.485
Within-R2 0.335 0.469
Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1995-2005. Time-dummies included
1996-2005. Robust standard errors in paranthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
7 Robustness checks
A way of verifying that the results of the paper are actually due to R&D-learning is to investigate how
an equivalent analysis on the sample of male non-technical workers compares to the analysis on
workers with a technical or scientific education. Non-technical workers are, supposedly, further away
from the research core of the plant, and if the results of the previous section captures R&D-learning,
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I should not find a similar pattern among non-technical workers.
The results of table 10 confirms this hypothesis. Though there is some indication of a negative
wage-discount for workers with a higher non-technical degree in the regression with firm-fixed ef-
fects, the magnitude is markedly smaller than what was found for workers with a technical or sci-
entific degree. Similar results (not reported here) emerge from the analyses with the two alternative
measures of R&D-experience included, though the coefficient on recent R&D-experience by itself is
positive and significant.
Table 10: The effect of R&D-experience on earnings for non-technical work-
ers.
Medium-level Master’s or
education PhD degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of low-skilled -0.3343*** -0.4300** 0.0108 0.0266
(0.0573) (0.1775) (0.1085) (0.1846)
Employees (1000) -0.1145*** 0.0541* -0.0593* -0.0046
(0.0215) (0.0322) (0.0350) (0.0666)
Employees (1000)2 0.0288*** -0.0024 0.0202** 0.0086
(0.0063) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0170)
Bachelor’s degree 0.2397*** 0.2313***
(0.0129) (0.0334)
Experience 0.0187*** 0.0201** 0.0523*** 0.0482***
(0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0047)
Experience2 -0.0003*** -0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
R&D-dummy (CRD) 0.0198 -0.0371 0.0082 -0.0256
(0.0497) (0.0893) (0.0639) (0.0753)
Experience × CRD 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0027 0.0052
(0.0057) (0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0073)
Experience2× CRD 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant 12.6994*** 12.6587*** 12.4645*** 12.4422***
(0.0609) (0.1370) (0.0832) (0.0843)
Firm-dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 3160 3160 2225 2225
R2 0.212 0.287
Within-R2 0.216 0.239
In column 3 and 4, I have left out workers with a PhD degree since there are only 12 such obser-
vations in the data. Dep. variable is log (yearly wage-income). Sample years 1995-2005. Time-
dummies included 1996-2005. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
A final comment concerns the choice of leaving out workers at plants with less that five employ-
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ees. These very small plants could for example be new entrants with a wage-structure different from
the rest of the sample. However, keeping workers from these plants in the sample produces similar
results as the ones reported in section 5.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate how R&D-investments affect return to experience and entry-wages for a
sample of full-time workers in an important high-tech industry; the pharmaceutical industry. Mo-
bility of key research personnel constitutes a potential cost to employers as mobility is a source of
technology transfers to competitors. This acts to lower incentives to undertake R&D-investments.
At the same time, formal models of worker mobility in research-intensive industries and models on
occupational learning emphasise that in a dynamic perspective worker mobility need not have a neg-
ative impact on R&D-investments. By the logic of these models, research-workers compensate their
employers for R&D-learning by accepting a lower wage than they could achieve in alternative em-
ployments with a lower learning content.
In a pooled sample of workers with a technical or scientific degree in the Norwegian machinery
and equipment industry, Møen (2005) finds evidence that male workers in R&D-environments accept
lower wages early in their career. The contribution of this paper is to investigate this question within
a single highly research-intensive industry; the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, the present study
uses plant-level information on R&D-activity to measure R&D-exposure which is an advantage over
firm-level R&D-measures.
In the main analysis, I estimate and compare wage-curves for male employees at R&D-active
plants and otherwise similar workers employed at other types of pharmaceutical plants, and I find
that workers with a Master’s or PhD degree, take a wage-discount of around 4-10% early in their career
in return for higher earnings later. In particular, recent R&D-experience is a source of significantly
higher wages for this group of workers.
With respect to workers with a medium-level technical education, I find that entry wages are
similar at both types of plants but that wage growth in the beginning of the career are lower at R&D-
active plants. For these workers it is only after about 25 years of experience that employment at R&D-
active plants translates into higher yearly earnings compared to workers at other types of plants. This
result compares to that in Møen (2005) in the sense that he finds that technical workers with R&D-
exposure catch up to otherwise similar workers markedly later than is the case for workers with a
higher technical or scientific degree.
An additional contribution is to present results on the female part of the workforce. This group
42
was left out in the main analysis to ease comparison with the results in Møen (2005), but as this group
of workers constitute more than 50% of the labour force it is important to investigate the hypothesis
on this sample as well. The estimated coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude than for men, but
statistically as strong.
Finally, I do not find that similar effects are at play in the group of non-technical workers which
is re-assuring as it confirms that the estimated coefficients capture the value of R&D-learning. Even
if non-technical workers are employed at R&D-active plants this group of workers are likely to be
further away from the research core and generally less able to transfer technical know-how.
Together these results suggest that the value of R&D-learning in the pharmaceutical industry is
at least partially internalised in the labour market. Furthermore, the estimations provide indirect
evidence in favour of theories arguing that labour mobility is a source of knowledge transfers.
43
References
ALMEIDA, P. AND B. KOGUT (1999): “Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in
Regional Networks,” Management Science, 45, 905–365.
ANDERSSON, F., M. FREEDMAN, J. HALTIWANGER, J. LANE, AND K. SHAW (2009): “Reaching for the
Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries,” The Economic Journal.
ARROW, K. J. (1962): The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, vol. 13 of NBER Special Conference Series, chap. Eco-
nomic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, 609–625.
BAUMGARDNER, J. R. (1988): “Physicians’ Service and the Division of Labour Across Local Mar-
kets,” The Journal of Political Economy, 96, 948–982.
COHEN, W. M. AND D. A. LEVINTHAL (1989): “Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D,”
The Economic Journal, 99, 569–596.
COMBES, P.-P. AND G. DURANTON (2006): “Labour pooling, labour poaching, and spatial cluster-
ing,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 1–28.
ELLISON, G., E. L. GLAESER, AND W. R. KERR (2010): “What Causes Industry Agglomeration? Evi-
dence from Coagglomeration Patterns,” American Economic Review, 100, 1195–1213.
FOSFURI, A. AND T. RØNDE (2004): “High-tech clusters, technology spillovers and trade secret
laws,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 45–65.
GAN, L. AND Q. LI (2004): “Efficiency of Thin and Thick Markets,” NBERWorking Paper, 10815.
JAFFE, A. B., M. TRAJTENBERG, AND R. HENDERSON (1993): “Geographic Localization of Knowledge
Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 32–59.
KIM, J. AND G. MARSCHKE (2005): “Labor Mobility of Scientists, Technological Diffusion, and the
Firm’s Patenting Decision,” Rand Journal of Economics, 36, 298–317.
MAGNANI, E. (2006): “Is worker’s mobility a source of R&D spillovers,” International Journal of
Manpower, 27.
MØEN, J. (2005): “Is Mobility of Technical Personnel a Source of R&D Spillovers,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 23, 81–111.
PAKES, A. AND S. NITZAN (1983): “Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employ-
ment and the Establishment of Rival Enterprises,” Journal of Labor Economics, 1, 345–365.
ROSEN, S. (1972): “Learning and Experience in the Labor Market,” Journal of Human Resources.
44
ROSENTHAL, S. S. AND W. C. STRANGE (2001): “The Determinants of Agglomeration,” Journal of
Urban Economics, 50, 191–229.
STERN, S. (2004): “Do Scientists Pay to be Scientists?” Management Science, 50, 835–853.
ZUCKER, L. G., M. R. DARBY, AND M. B. BREWER (1998): “Intellectual Human Capital and the Birth
of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises,” American Economic Review, 88, 290–306.
45
 46
Technology sourcing via hiring and the use of non-compete
clauses
47
 48
Technology sourcing via hiring and the use of non-compete
clauses.
Kathrine Thrane Bløcher
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
KATHRINE.THRANE.BLOCHER@ECON.KU.DK
November 2010
Abstract
A number of empirical investigations have established that multinational companies increas-
ingly locate development activities in the leading science centres of the world in order to gain
access to advanced technological know-how. In this sense they can be said to "listen in on new
ideas" with the aim of using these for their own purposes, and this raises questions with respect
to the effect on research investments in those regions. I model the sourcing of technologies as
an imitative activity, and I build on insights from the economic geography literature on localised
knowledge spillovers to suggest a positive feedback effect from imitation to innovation. In par-
ticular, I suggest that labour market competition among a group of imitators generate positive
incentives for young scientist-employees to contribute effort to research projects. At the same
time the threat of future imitation via employee-mobility is detrimental to the incentives of the
research firm because it lowers the value of successful innovation. Non-compete clauses offer
protection to employers against worker-mobility, but the results of the model suggest that when
wage competition among imitators are sufficiently strong profitability of projects are higher if
firms refrain from including such clauses in their employment contracts.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly, multinationals establish research and development activities away from the headquar-
ter, in the leading science centres of the world (OECD (2008), OECD (2010)). The conventional view
on foreign R&D-activities is that they are aimed at adapting core-technologies to a local market,
but case-studies and econometric evidence indicate that a major motive for locating R&D-activities
abroad is a need for sourcing advanced technologies and know-how (see e.g. Almeida (1996), Gery-
badze and Reger (1999), von Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), Griffith et al. (2006), Todo and Schimizu-
tani (2008), Blit (2009)). For example, firms use technology sourcing as a way of catching up with
technology leaders (Kuemmerlee (1999)), to expand technical diversity (Song et al. (2003)), or as a
spring board to carry out own R&D-activities at a later stage (Chung and Yeaple (2008)).
The existing literature on this topic is primarily empirical, and the focus is on the recipient firm,
but it is natural to think that technology sourcing has a considerable impact on the research con-
ducted in the donor-region. The aim of this paper is to address this issue in a theoretical framework.
For this purpose, I view the sourcing of technologies as imitative activities.
Traditionally, models of industrial R&D stress that imitation prevents the investing party from ap-
propriating the full return to a successful innovation from which it follows that R&D is underprovided
by the market. In contrast, this paper builds on insights from the economic geography literature on
localised knowledge spillovers to suggest a positive feedback effect from imitation to innovation. In
particular, in the model of this paper, multiple imitators who each relies on hiring to access new
technologies and to adapt these to the market compete for experienced scientists. The tougher is
wage-competition, the higher the return to innovative efforts of scientist-employees and the better
are their incentives to contribute effort at an early research-stage. I show that when wage competi-
tion among imitators are sufficiently strong, entry of imitators are beneficial to the innovative efforts
of the industry.
This motivation highlights that the term imitation does not refer to copying of simple production
technologies. Rather, my focus is on imitation at an early stage of the technology’s life-cycle when
knowledge is tacit in nature, and the human capital input of the researcher is essential for its dis-
semination. Empirical research by Lynne Zucker, Michael Darby, and co-authors confirm that star-
scientists play a key role for start-ups in the US bio- and nano-technology industries (see e.g. Zucker
et al. (1998), Zucker et al. (2002), Zucker and Darby (2006)). Likewise, results by Almeida and Kogut
(1999), Song et al. (2003), and Kim and Marschke (2005) for US-engineers indicate that mobility is a
driver of technology diffusion. Locating close to technology leaders facilitates hiring of key engineers
and scientists and is a way for firms to stay at the forefront of the technological development while at
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the same time offering a way for researchers to capitalise on their know-how.1
Of course, an inventing firm has a strong incentive to protect itself against mobility of research
personnel to avoid both loss of human capital and diffusion of new knowledge. One obvious way
of achieving this is to include a non-compete clause in the employment contract limiting an em-
ployee’s ability to move to a competing firm in a specific geographic area and period of time. Gilson
(1999) argues that refraining from using such contracts can be jointly advantageous for firms in some
industries. According to the author, lack of enforcement of these covenants by Californian courts
contributed to the culture of job-hopping in the Silicon Valley computer industry – a regional char-
acteristic that, since Saxenian (1994)’s famous study, is often emphasised as one of the key factors
behind its high rates of innovation.
The hypothesis of Gilson finds support in Fallick et al. (2006) who study monthly job-changes in
California and other US-states. They find that IT-clusters in California generally have higher mobility
rates than IT-clusters elsewhere in the U.S. whereas other industries do not show similar regional dif-
ferences. The authors argue that the computer industry distinguishes itself from many other indus-
tries by its strong modularity of innovations acting to make gains from access to know-how outweigh
the cost of losing human capital.2 The present paper likewise adds to the literature on the optimal
use of non-compete clauses but is concerned with a different trade-off. The advantageous effects
associated with refraining from using such clauses stem from a positive employee-incentive effect
rather than from future access to competitor’s know-how.
In the model, research firms initially choose whether to locate in a region in which non-compete
clauses are enforced by courts (NC-region), or in a region in which firms cannot protect their inno-
vations by including such clauses in wage contracts (C-region). Subsequently, they choose whether
to undertake a research project or not. The probability of success depends on both firm investments
and the effort of its scientist-employee, and workers are borrowing constrained. This is equivalent to
the set-up in Aghion and Tirole (1994). Technological output is advanced and has value to entering
imitators who can copy the technology by hiring experienced research personnel. This is a source
of wage-competition which improves worker incentives but also lowers firm investments in research
because imitation decreases the value of successful projects. When non-compete clauses are in use,
the research firm is a monopsonist employer and scientist-employees have no way of capitalising on
their research effort. Hence, the research firm appropriates the full return to a successful innovation,
1Almeida (1996) in the concluding section, notes that a close review of U.S. patent citation patterns suggests that foreign
firms may not be targeting just regions but even specific firms in their learning efforts.
2Other empirical studies on the role of non-compete clauses are Garmaise (2009) and Marx et al. (2009) who use variation
in enforcement regimes across U.S. states to investigate whether non-compete clauses matter for mobility patterns and
R&D-investments. Both studies are positive towards the hypothesis in Gilson (1999)
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but it is also the sole contributor to research.
The optimal choice of location trades off these effects. Naturally, it depends on whether the in-
vestment in the research project by the firm or the worker are most important, but the contribution
of this paper is to show that sufficiently strong wage-competition increases total monetary incentives
at the research stage and contributes to making the C-region attractive to research firms. There are
two distinct cases to consider.
In case 1, wage-competition among entering imitators is strong in the sense that the original em-
ployer prefers losing the scientist-employee rather than offering a wage that matches the wage-level
in the imitating sector. This implies that the incentive gain to the worker exceeds the incentive loss to
the firm, and in this case, expected profit is always increasing in the wage to experienced researchers.
Only if the contribution of the worker to the research project is relatively unimportant does the in-
dustry locate in the NC-region. I argue that the computer industry fits well with the criteria for an
industry that gains from locating in the C-region. It depends to a large degree on the creative input
of workers to generate innovations, and IT-technologies have multiple uses just as they can be built
upon making it likely that the value to imitators of copying new technologies exceeds any loss to the
original inventing firm.
In case 2, wage-competition is weak, and it is optimal for the research firms to retain experienced
scientists by offering the prevailing wage in the imitating sector. In this case, the positive effect of
wage-competition on worker effort is exactly out-weighed by a negative effect on firm investments.
As the wage-payment in addition lowers the return to a successful innovation, a marginal increase in
the wage-level of the imitating sector serves to lower the attractiveness of the C-region.
The welfare analysis shows that it is never optimal to force industries to include non-compete
clauses in their employment contracts. On the contrary, research-employees have higher expected
earnings when non-compete clauses are not in use, and this makes the social planner prefer the
C-region over the NC-region as long as firm investments are not too important for the success of the
research project. However, the positive worker incentives in regions without non-compete clauses act
to lower the range of industries for which the equilibrium location differs from the socially optimal
location.
The model framework and results are related to other models of innovation and imitation in the
following way. In North-South models, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), Northern producers
face high labour cost but have a comparative advantage in innovation whereas imitators located in
the South pay lower wages. Innovations in terms of quality improvements on existing product lines
provide the Northern producers with market power until the new quality is successfully copied by a
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producer in the South. Product market competition takes place in prices and the lower production
cost in the South forces the Northern producer out of the market until its research investment again
allows it to advance the technological frontier. In this way production alternates between the high
cost North and the low cost South.3
These models address imitation of well-developed codified technologies that can easily be trans-
ferred across the globe whereas the present paper is motivated by imitation at an early stage in which
geographic proximity is important and the novelty of knowledge makes it likely that both first and
second users can extract profits from the market. As I have argued this adds a different dimension to
the relationship between innovators and imitators.
Bessen and Maskin (2009) are concerned with advanced technology absorption by imitators and
draw attention to a possible positive impact of imitation on innovation, though their idea is different
from the one in this paper. In that model, innovation is a sequential process and research by com-
petitors complementary in the sense that methods and ideas do not perfectly overlap, for example
because the imitator possesses specialised information about a market. In this case, imitation may
be a help to innovators because it increases the probability of success at future research stages, and it
follows that strict patent laws may lower research and development expenditures. Interestingly, the
authors support their argument by noting that patent protection in some of the most innovative in-
dustries of the last forty years – software, computers and semiconductors – has been weak and thus
these industries have been characterised by favourable conditions for imitation.
Other papers are concerned with the role of labour mobility for technology diffusion and research
activities. Pakes and Nitzan (1983) deduce the optimal wage contract when an entrepreneur risks
that a scientist-employee leaves to join a competitor and reveal essential knowledge about produc-
tion technologies. The optimal wage contract consists of two parts. A variable part that is tied to the
firm’s profit and a fixed part that exactly satisfies the scientist’s participation constraint. As the en-
trepreneur can withdraw the future high earnings of the scientist from the first-period skill-adjusted
wage, this type of technology diffusion does not affect the profitability of projects. Moreover, in the
baseline model there is no mobility in equilibrium.4 Other authors have extended on this frame-
work and have studied conditions for mobility as well as added different forms of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection. Kim and Marschke (2005) consider the firm’s patenting decision, Fosfuri and
3Models of escape-competition argues that entry or catching-up of technological lagging firms by generating competition
pushes firms to innovate to escape the downward pressure on profits from product market competition (see Aghion and
Griffith (2005) for a review).
4In an extension, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) model entry by a third party and show that it can be optimal for the entrepreneur
to induce the researcher to leave and start on his own such that the entrant expects tougher competition and chooses to
stay out of the market.
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Rønde (2004) are concerned with a set-up with cumulative knowledge and trade secrets, and Franco
and Mitchell (2008) study the optimality of non-compete clauses in a model in which it is private in-
formation to the employee whether he/she has learned. The results of this paper add to this range
of models by considering worker investment incentives and showing that even if there is a lower
bound on wages, a highly competitive labour market with mobility might be mutually advantageous
to scientist-employees and firms.
In Combes and Duranton (2006) firms hire a continuum of workers who accumulate strategic
human capital during the first period. Hiring competitor-employees in the second period is a source
of cost reductions and this drives wage competition for workers. Workers are heterogeneous with
respect to their cost of changing employer allowing for both poaching and retention of workers in
equilibrium. The model links product market competition and labour market competition, but in
contrast to this paper, it leaves aside any investment-choices by workers or firms. A different aspect of
worker-mobility is formation of spin-outs by former employees. This is the topic in Franco and Filson
(2006) . Workers simultaneously contribute to research and learn the know-how of their employers
which they can use to found a new research firm. The likelihood of success in research depends
on the level of know-how of the employer which varies across agents. The authors test their model
empirically and note that it is particular relevant for a young industry in which technology adoption
and firm creation are driven by a small group of forerunners.
Finally, the present paper draws on insights from the economic geography literature emphasis-
ing beneficial effects from reduced employer monopsony power in industrial clusters. In Rotemberg
and Saloner (2000), a thick local labour market induces workers to invest in industry-specific human
capital as competition between employers forces firms to pay high-skilled workers their marginal
value thereby ensuring workers a return to their investment and increasing overall productivity in
the region. Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) consider the opposing impact on worker and firm
investments. However, in contrast to this paper they only consider cases where either the firm or the
worker is the investing party just as workers are unproductive while acquiring skills. Almazan et al.
(2007) combine the labour pooling model of Krugman (1991) with industry specific human capital
investments by firms or workers. Clustering may be attractive because it increases the pool of skilled
workers available to a firm upon a positive productivity shock, but at the same time it discourages
firm investments in human capital.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and in section 3,
I carry out the analysis. Section 4 determines how the socially optimal location decision compares
with the market equilibrium. Finally, in section 5, I conclude.
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2 Model introduction
The model describes a research intensive industry faced with a threat of imitation by a large number
of multinationals that scan the global economy for new technological advancements and establish
themselves in regions at the technological forefront to learn about the latest innovations. Accordingly,
in the model research firms make the long term decision with respect to which line of research to
pursue knowing that if successful, a global pool of competing producers will make an effort to imitate
and market the innovation before the full market potential of the new technology has been realised
by the original inventor.
I consider a three-period model of a research-intensive industry. Initially, before any research-
decisions have been taken, firms decide irreversibly on the legal environment in which they will con-
tinue their operations. They choose between locating in a region in which courts do not enforce
non-compete covenants (the Compete-region/C-region) or in the Non-Compete region (NC-region)
in which firms can use such clauses to prevent scientist-employees from leaving for a competitor.5
There are two stages in product development. A stochastic innovation stage which requires the joint
effort of the firm and a scientist-employee, and a final, deterministic development stage. At the be-
ginning of period 2, before the final development stage is completed, imitators can enter and hire
successful scientists. Below, I lay out the details of the model.
Research stage: There is a continuum of potential research firms each having capacity to carry
out at most one project with market potential ∆ in case of success but generating zero output oth-
erwise (when I analyse the model, I normalise ∆ to 1). Firms differ with respect to the fixed cost of
implementation, Fr =φr , for example because they use different methods or are heterogenous with
respect to their overall capacity for research. In other words, to some firms projects are fairly easy
to undertake and require few initial investments by the firm, but to other firms projects are complex
and cost-intensive. I order firms in ascending order by the size of the fixed cost.6
Conditional on implementation, projects are symmetric. The research technology is given by a
probability of success P(s u c c e s s ) =µk+(1−µ)e where e is worker effort, k is an investment made by
the firm and µ ∈]0, 1[ is the relative importance of the investment by the two parties. For simplicity,
5This is the only type of IP-protection that I consider. In this sense, the model concerns competition over non-patentable
parts of new technologies. Kim and Marschke (2005) model the firm’s patenting choice as a response to employee mobility.
In their model, patenting not only protects the competitive advantage of the firm in case of mobility but also changes the
value to the employee of leaving relative to staying.
6Even though I associate each research project with a different firm, the number of firms in the model is actually un-
specified. The set-up is equally consistent with a research sector consisting of one big firm that undertake a number of
differentiated projects each with unit labour requirement. As a matter of fact, these small projects could add to one big
project. The important point is that the marginal contribution of an extra project to aggregate profit in the R&D sector is
falling in the number of projects.
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conditional on µ, the parties are equally good at contributing to research. Their cost-function is
quadratic and given by c (h) = 12λh
2, h = k , e . I restrict λ to λ>∆, which ensures that the probability
of success never exceeds one.
The parameter µ captures differences in research technology at the industry level. For example,
µ close to zero represents industries in which human capital is essential to the research process as
for example the computer software industry. At the same time, µ close to one does not imply that
research takes place without any contribution by workers. Rather, k captures any research intensity
induced by firm investments including investment in management and reward structures. This im-
plies that industries in which verifiability and monitoring of research is fairly easy are industries in
which firm investments are important.
Having this in mind, in the model research firms cannot monitor the worker and though the out-
come of the research process is observable to the firm and the scientist-employee, it is not verifiable
in court. That is, incentive contracts are not enforceable. This means that an outside employment
option that depends on scientist effort is essential for inducing the worker to contribute e > 0 to
research.
Development stage: At the end of period 1, the research firm knows whether the project succeeded
or failed, but before the product can be marketed it takes a period of further development. This could
for example be the case if the research process results in a prototype of a new product, but final
commercialisation requires further testing and adaption to specific consumer groups. The process is
deterministic and costless, but if the firm fails to keep the worker at this stage the firm incurs a loss of
δ, 0 < δ <∆. This parameter can be interpreted in two ways. First, the worker’s human capital may
simply be essential for the final development phase. This would be in line with the assumption made
in Dechenaux et al. (2008) on inventor moral hazard and university licensing. Another interpretation
is that a new innovation provides the innovator with market power for two periods, each of which
contributes 12∆ to the profit of the research firm. If an imitator hires the researcher at the beginning
of period 2, it copies the technology and steals some of the market (of value δ). Such an interpreta-
tion is similar to the quality-ladder interpretation of innovation used in Aghion and Griffith (2005). I
cannot distinguish between these interpretations in the model. With respect to the implications and
predictions of this paper it only matters how the size of δ compares with the equilibrium wage in the
imitating sector.
Imitation: Imitation takes place in a discrete number of firms. There is free entry into this sector
and entry takes place at the beginning of period 2 after the research projects have finished but before
the final development stage. Imitators produce by hiring last periods successful scientists who are
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capable of transferring the technological know-how to a new employer. In the following, I denote
these researchers "experienced scientists".
An imitator pays a fixed cost of F to enter, and hereafter the production technology exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale and is given by:
y (l i ) =β l i − 1
2
γl 2i (1)
where l i is the number of successful researchers hired by an imitator, and β measures the maximum
value of technology transfers by each worker. A reasonable assumption is that the imitator cannot
extract more value from each innovation than the inventing firm which is ensured by β < ∆. A re-
striction on the entry cost of F <

β
γ
2
ensures that the equilibrium wage in the imitating sector is
positive.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of international technology sourcing on host coun-
try research. As such F captures the cost of establishing facilities abroad to learn and source tech-
nologies. One can think of two types of imitators: Imitators that establish traditional production in
the host region, and a different type of imitators that establish "listening posts" in the host region but
transfer any acquired technological know-how out of the region to produce at facilities abroad. Entry
costs of the last type are likely to be higher than entry costs of the first type.
The production function is identical across imitators such that every imitator is equally good at
copying knowledge. At the same time, the degree of decreasing returns to scale as measured by γ
reflects a limit with respect to the firms’ capacity to absorb new technology. Thus, in contrast to the
R&D-sector, an extra imitator raises the average productivity of the sector. As will become clear, F
and γ together determine the aggregate capacity of the imitating sector for absorbing technology and
thereby determine the intensity with which firms compete for experienced researchers.7
Workers: There is a large number of workers who each lives and works for the two periods of in-
novation and development/imitation. They are risk neutral and maximise expected total life-time
income less of costs of research effort. A worker who fails to find employment in the research or imi-
tating sector has the option of moving to a different industry. I normalise their outside option to zero,
w¯ = 0. I assume that workers are unable to borrow against future income, which renders scientist-
employees unable to compensate their employer fully for the value of human capital accumulation in
the research process. In this type of setting, in which the value of learning about the latest and most
advanced technological know-how is potentially very high, this seems reasonable. In the model, it
serves the role of maintaining the traditional arguments against imitation (imitation lowers research
7In addition to this economic intuition, the decreasing returns to scale specification for the imitating sector ensures com-
petition between imitators for experienced researchers in equilibrium which is crucial to the results of this paper.
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investments by firms) while at the same time studying its relation to the positive incentive effect with
respect to workers.8
Figure 1 summarises the timing and economic decisions of the model. In addition to the param-
eters already introduced, NR is the number of research firms, w1R is the period 1 wage offered to a
researcher, NI is the number of entering imitators, and w I , w2R are the period 2 wage offers made by
firms in the imitating sector and research sector respectively. In the analysis, I use superscripts ’NC’
and ’C’ to distinguish the NC-region equilibrium from the C-region equilibrium. In the subsequent
sections, I solve for the equilibrium expected profits to research firm r in each of the two regions and
compare these to determine the equilibrium location of industry µ. In the C-region, research firms
are faced with a threat of entering imitators (NI ) whereas these have no incentives to enter in the
NC-region. For this reason, labour market dynamics are completely different in the two locations.
C-region:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
NR
entry of
research firms
w1R
hiring
e , k
research-
investments
NI
entry of
imitators
(C-region)
w I ,w2R
wage
offers
production
and sales
NR w1R e , k w2R
NC-region:
Figure 1: Timing of the game
3 Analysis
This section begins with a derivation of the outcome in the NC-region in which non-compete clauses
are enforced by courts. I then move on to the analysis of the subgame where the industry is located
in the C-region. Finally, I solve for the optimal location of firms in industry µ by comparing expected
profits in the two regions.
I will assume that research firms that refrain from using covenants in the employment contract
always locate in the C-region even though the model framework does not provide a formal argument
for this assumption. A sketch of the underlying reasoning runs as follows. First, ex ante uncertainty
8In a number of other models of mobility induced technology spillovers, researchers are assumed to compensate employ-
ers for their future labour market value. Probably an assumption in between these two extremes is closest to reality. In
the present model, the important thing is that workers cannot fully compensate employers for their expected future higher
earnings as this introduces the trade-off between firm and worker incentives to invest in research.
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from the point of view of imitators with respect to the industry’s use of non-compete covenants would
render imitators more prone to locating in the C-region. Second, even though a scientist-employee is
not subject to a non-compete clause he only contributes positive effort if he expects entry upon com-
pletion of the research stage. Accordingly, if labour market competition is beneficial to the research
firms of an industry, they should locate in the C-region as this offers the most efficient incentive
mechanism with respect to their scientist-employees.
3.1 Non-Compete region
As I explained in the previous section, I assume equivalency between locating in the NC-region and
including a non-compete clause in the employment contract. Since imitators are prevented from hir-
ing experienced researchers and thereby accessing new technologies, they have no reason to pay the
fixed entry cost F . With no imitators in period 2, the alternative employment option of experienced
scientists is the outside labour market in which all workers earn w¯ = 0. Therefore, the optimal wage
offer by the research firm to an experienced researcher is w N C2R = 0 which the researcher accepts and
stays with the original employer.
In period 1, the young scientist knows that independently of the outcome of the research stage,
he earns a wage of zero in period 2. Therefore, he contributes an effort level of zero to the research
project. The firm chooses k to optimise E (pi(k )) = µk − 12λk 2 and, thus, the optimal choice of
research-intensity is: k N C = µ
λ
.
Expected profit from undertaking research project r is E (piN Cr ) = µk
N C − c (k N C )−φr = µ22λ −φr .
Projects are undertaken until the value of the last project is zero, thus the number of research projects
is: RN C = µ
2
2φλ .
Finally, since scientist-employees receive a wage of zero in both periods, and there is no entry by
imitators, expected total welfare is the sum of expected profits on all projects undertaken: E (W N C ) =∫ RN C
0
µ2
2λ −φr d r .
3.2 Compete region
In the C-region, the only way of retaining a research-employee upon a successful research outcome
is to offer a sufficiently high wage. This section analyses how the existence of an imitating sector that
competes for labour input of researchers affect research incentives.
3.3 Period 2 equilibrium
I start by considering the entry decision of imitators and allocation of workers within the imitating
sector for a given mass of experienced scientists. In the following, let the number of successful expe-
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rienced scientists that move to the imitating sector be given by L I . Below, I solve for the equilibrium
wage, w CI and the allocation of experienced scientists conditional on L I and NI .
9
Conditional on the number of imitating firms and the number of experienced researchers, two
conditions must be met in equilibrium. First, an entrant is willing to hire experienced researchers as
long as the marginal product of labour exceeds the prevailing wage. From equation (1), the marginal
product of labour is given by β −γl i , and it follows that firm-level labour demand is given by:
w I =β −γl i
l i =
β −w I
γ
(2)
Second, imitators are symmetric and thus within the sector workers must be distributed equally. Else,
some scientist could earn a higher wage by changing employer.10 Inserting l i = L INI in (2) yields:
w I =β −γ L I
NI
(3)
Equation (3) shows that the fewer experienced researchers to imitating firms, the tougher is competi-
tion for their skills and know-how and the higher the wage to an experienced scientist. Similarly, the
decreasing returns to scale parameter is also a measure of the degree of wage-competition.
3.3.1 Wage in the imitating sector
The free-entry assumption implies that imitators enter and hire labour until the expected profit of
entering is zero.
Profit is given by revenue minus wage-cost and the fixed cost of entry:
pii = y (l i )−w I l i − F (4)
Insert production technology y (l i ) =β l i − 12γl 2i and the expression for the wage (3):
pii =β l i − 1
2
γl 2i − (β −γ L INI )l i − F
=−1
2
γl 2i +γ
L I
NI
l i − F (5)
9In the rest of the paper, I assume that at least two imitators enter. This requires research output to be of a certain size (φ
sufficiently small). In principle, one could imagine that only one imitating firm finds it attractive to enter such that only the
research firm and the imitator competes for scientists. This would change the game. Specifically, the maximum wage to an
experienced scientist would be δ. I am specifically interested in the outcome in which competition for labour takes place
between imitators, and I abstract from the alternative case. Since the research sector in this model represents the leading
science centres of the world, I find that it is reasonable to assume that they are of a size that supports entry by multiple
imitators.
10This also means that I allow for a worker to split his time between multiple employers.
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In equilibrium, all imitators employ the same share of workers, l i = L INI and earn identical profit:
piI = γ(
L I
NI
)2− 1
2
γ(
L I
NI
)2− F
piI =
1
2
γ(
L I
NI
)2− F (6)
The free-entry condition implies that imitating firms enter the production sector until E (piI ) = 0. This
expression is satisfied whenever:
1
2
γ(
L I
NI
)2− F = 0
L I
NI
=
r
2F
γ
(7)
By inserting expression (7) in (3), I arrive at the equilibrium wage as a function of the parameters of
the model:
w CI =β −
p
2γF (8)
Free entry of imitators implies that the sector adapts to the supply of experienced researchers, and
the young researcher faces no uncertainty with respect to the wage that he receives in the second
period if he succeeds in research and is hired by an imitator.
3.3.2 Period 2 labour market equilibrium
Expression (8), w CI = β − γ
p
2γF , represents the outside option of an experienced scientist in the
C-region. If successful in research, competition among imitators ensures that he receives this wage if
he accepts employment in the imitating sector. This is then also the wage that a research firm must
pay its scientist-employee in period 2 to prevent him from leaving. An innovating firm experiences a
loss of δ if it fails to retain the scientist, and therefore is willing to pay any wage below δ but prefer
the loss to any wage above δ. Thus for w CI ≤ δ, the scientist stays with the innovating firm whereas
for w CI >δ, the scientist moves to an imitator. In any case, the scientist receives a wage of w
C
I .
11
Since w CI represents the highest period 2 wage that lets an imitator cover its fixed cost of entry,
F , there is no alternative equilibrium with w I > w CI . Likewise, in the δ < w
C
I case, the free entry
condition ensures that exactly the number of imitators enters that ensures a wage of w CI .
Finally, to close the period 2 equilibrium conditional on the number of experienced researchers,
the number of entering imitators is given by:
N CI =
 L IÆ 2Fγ if w CI >δ0 if w CI ≤δ (9)
11Note that in the break-even case w CI = δ, I assume that the scientist stays with the research firm. This would be the
outcome if I had modeled some of the mobility costs associated with changing employer.
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The upper part of this expression says that the higher the fixed cost of production relative to the
degree of decreasing returns, the fewer firms enter the imitating sector, and the more experienced
scientists each imitator employs.12 A high value of γ translates into weak labour market competition
because the value of technology transfer falls quickly with the number of hired workers. Thus, when
γ is high profit per worker is high, and it takes less workers to let the firm cover its entry cost. For a
given L I , this allows for more entry into the imitating sector in equilibrium.
3.4 Period 1 equilibrium
I now show how labour market competition in period 2 affects investments at the research stage by
firms and scientist-employees.
3.4.1 Contribution to research by worker and firm
When a young worker is hired into a research-project, he decides on how much effort to contribute.
From the point of view of the worker, all projects are identical, and the effort choice is independent
of the project. In the following, I therefore remove subscript, r , on projects.
A young scientist knows that if successful, he earns w CI =β−
p
2γF in the period 2 labour market.
Therefore, a young scientist maximises the expected value of learning given by E (UCy (k , e )) = (µk +
(1−µ)e )×w CI − c (e ). This is equivalent to solving the following maximisation problem:
m a x (1−µ)e ×w CI − c (e ) (10)
Using c (e ) = 12λe
2 and differentiating with respect to e yields:
(1−µ)w CI −λe = 0
e C =
(1−µ)w CI
λ
(11)
The prospect of capitalising on the research effort in the subsequent period is the source of incentives
to the young researcher. The more intense the competition for technological input relative to the cost
of effort is, the more effort the worker puts into research.
In contrast to the worker’s investment problem, the maximisation problem of the firm depends
on whether the firm is able to retain the scientist-employee in the period 2 labour market, or the
imitating sector offers the highest wage. The firm maximises expected profits, E (piC1 (k , e )) = (µk
C +
12With a discrete number of imitators, this number is in principle the highest integer such that N CI ≤ L I 1q 2F
γ
. However, to
maintain simplicity, I allow for the last entrant to scale down production – reducing F – such that it is profitable to enter
and to employ the residual number of workers at wage w CI .
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(1−µ)e C )× (1−m i n{δ, w CI })− c (k C )with respect to k . This amounts to:
m a x
¨
µk × (1−δ)− c (k ) if w CI >δ
µk × (1−w CI )− c (k ) if w CI ≤δ (12)
where the upper part represents the case in which a successful researcher is known to leave the re-
search firm in period 2 such that the firm incurs a loss of δ. The lower part of the expression repre-
sents the other case in which the threat of entry induces the research firm to pay w CI to an experienced
researcher.
With c (k ) = 12λk
2, the solution to the above maximisation problem is:
k C =
(
µ(1−δ)
λ
if w CI >δ
µ(1−w CI )
λ
if w CI ≤δ
(13)
Because the firm cannot fully protect its investment in period 2, it undertakes fewer investments
in research than it would have had, had it been located in the NC-region, k N C = µ
λ
> k C . More-
over, the expression shows that for low values of the wage in the imitating sector w CI < δ, research-
investments of the firm are decreasing in the wage because it is optimal for the research firm to meet
the wage-offers made by imitators and to retain a successful scientist-employee. On the contrary,
in the other case tougher wage-competition does not affect the investment made by the firm. The
reason is that the loss to the research firm from employee-mobility is independent of the degree of
wage-competition among imitators. When imitators push the wage-level above δ, a research firm
prefers to let the worker go even though it lowers the value of the project by δ.
3.4.2 Wage to a young researcher
In the C-region, young workers are aware that employment on a research project improves their fu-
ture earnings potential either due to their own effort or because of investments made by the firm.
Accordingly, a young worker is willing to work at a research project at a wage w C1R such that w
C
1R ≥
w¯ −w CI (µk C +(1−µ)e C )−c (e C )where w¯ = 0 is the wage in the outside labour market. The wage that
exactly satisfies this condition is negative reflecting that a rational worker is willing to compensate
the research firm for the learning potential at a research project. However, workers are borrowing
constrained implying that any wage-offer needs to satisfy w C1R ≥ 0. Hence, the period 1 wage is given
by w C1R = 0.
13
13See footnote 8 for a brief discussion of this assumption.
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3.4.3 Expected profit to a research firm
Expected profit to research firm r is given by (µk C+(1−µ)e C )×(1−m i n{δ, w CI })−c (k C )−Fr . Inserting
the previously found expressions for k C and e C , I arrive at:
E (piCr ) =


µ2(1−δ)
λ
+ (1−µ)
2w CI
λ

× (1−δ)− µ2(1−δ)22λ − Fr if w CI >δ
µ2(1−w CI )
λ
+( (1−µ)
2w CI
λ

×1−w CI − µ2(1−w CI )22λ − Fr if w CI ≤δ (14)
where w CI is given by equation (3). Reducing this expression and inserting Fr =φr yields:
E (piCr ) =
 1−δλ

µ2(1−δ)
2 +(1−µ)2w CI
−φr if w CI >δ
1−w CI
λ

µ2(1−w CI )
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

−φr if w CI ≤δ
(15)
Thus, for w CI >δ, expected profit of a research project is unambiguously increasing in w
C
I due to the
positive incentive effect on workers. When w CI < δ, w
C
I has a negative impact on the profitability of
successful projects, and expected profit of a research firm is therefore decreasing in w CI unless µ is
small.14
3.4.4 Number of research projects
In equilibrium, expected profits of the marginal project equals 0, and the number of projects, RC , is
determined by E (piCR ) = 0. From (15) it follows that the number of research projects undertaken each
period is:
RC =
 1−δφλ

µ2(1−δ)
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

if w CI >δ
1−w CI
φλ

µ2(1−w CI )
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

if w CI ≤δ
(16)
Finally, from an ex ante perspective, E (N CI ) =
E (L I )Æ
2F
γ
. Where L I is the number of successful scien-
tists that move to the imitating sector. When w CI > δ, all successful scientists move to the imitating
sector such that E (L I ) = (µk C +(1−µ)e C )×RC , and in the opposite case no scientist moves such that
L I = 0.
3.4.5 Equilibrium in C-region
Below, I summarise the equilibrium in the C-region subgame. It depends on how the loss from
researcher-mobility to the firm (δ) and the gain from wage-competition to the workers (w CI ) com-
pare.
14For w CI <δ,
∂ E (piCr )
∂w CI
< 0 if µ
2
(1−µ)2 <
2w CI −1
1−w CI .
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Equilibrium effort, equilibrium wage offers, and expected profit to an imitating firm are independent
of δ:
w CI =β −
p
2γF
e C = (1−µ)w
C
I
λ
E (pii ) = 0, i = {1, N CI }
Research employment, mobility, expected profit to a research firm, expected utility to researchers, and
the number of entering imitators depend on δ:
Case 1 (mobility) w CI >δ:
w CR = 0
k C = µ(1−δ)
λ
E (piCr ) =
1−δ
λ

µ2(1−δ)
2 +(1−µ)2w CI
−φr, r = [0, N CR ]
N CR =R
C = 1−δ
φλ

µ2(1−δ)
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

E (N CI ) =
(µk C+(1−µ)e C )×N CRÆ
2F
γ
E (UC ) = w
C
I
λ

µ2(1−δ)+ (1−µ)2w CI2

Case 2 (no mobility) w CI −δ≤ 0:
w CR =w
C
I
k C = µ(1−w
C
I )
λ
E (piCr ) =
1−w CI
λ

µ2(1−w CI )
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

−φr, r = [0, N CR ]
N CR =R
C = 1−w
C
I
φλ

µ2(1−w CI )
2 +(1−µ)2w CI

N CI = 0
E (UC ) = w
C
I
λ

µ2(1−w CI )+ (1−µ)
2w CI
2

The next section solves for the optimal location of the firm according to the relative size of ex-
pected profits in the two regions.
3.5 Location choice
Since research projects are identical conditional on the initial fixed cost of implementation, it is the
per-project profitability that determines where the industry locates. As the previous discussion indi-
cates, low costs of worker-mobility to research firms (low δ) and dependence on human capital (low
µ) make the C-region attractive, just as high-powered incentives to workers (high w CI ) in some cases
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increases the profitability of projects in the C-region. However, the exact interaction between these
parameters are most easily shown graphically.
Figure 2 illustrates how the preferred region depends on µ, w CI , and δ. For a given r, firms com-
pare E (piN Cr ) =
µ2
2λ with E (pi
C
r ) as given by expression (15). In the figure, ν ,ν represent combinations
of µ and w CI that equalise profits in the two regions making research firms indifferent between the
two locations. ν indicates that w CI >δ such that we are in case 1:
ν : {(µ, w CI )|1−δλ

µ2(1−δ)
2
+(1−µ)2w CI

− µ2
2λ
= 0} (17)
This relationship between µ and w CI that equalises profit in the two regions is such that:
µ2
(1−µ)2 =
2w CI
1
1−δ −1+δ
(18)
where the fraction µ
2
(1−µ)2 measures the importance of the investment by the firm in research relative
to the worker’s contribution. This expression depends on δ since there is mobility in the C-region
equilibrium, and research firms incur the loss of δ if they choose to locate in this region. In the figure,
ν is drawn for δ = 14 and δ =
1
3 . Below ν , E (pi
C
r ) > E (pi
N C
r ) and firms prefer locating in the C-region,
whereas above ν , firms prefer locating in the NC-region. The right-hand side of (18) is increasing in
w CI since the nominator is positive for 0<δ < 1. Accordingly, if w
C
I increases, industries with higher
values of µmove to the C-region.
The intuition behind this reasoning is that w CI only has an effect on expected profitability of a
project via the worker’s effort decision, and this effect is positive. Thus, conditional on w CI > δ,
expected profits in the C-region is always increasing in w CI . This means that as wage-competition
among imitators increases, it becomes attractive for industries with higher values of µ to locate in the
C-region. Firms in these industries locate in the C-region to take advantage of the higher total mon-
etary incentives offered in the C-region. For values of µ between ν and 12 this implies that research
investments of the most efficient part – the firm – actually decreases.
Similar to the above, ν represents combinations of µ and w CI for which research firms are indif-
ferent between the two locations conditional on w CI ≤δ:
ν : {(µ, w CI )|1−w
C
I
λ

µ2(1−w CI )
2
+(1−µ)2w CI

− µ2
2λ
= 0} (19)
Again this amounts to:
µ2
(1−µ)2 =
2(1−w CI )
2−w CI
(20)
Note, that δ does not enter this expression since there is no mobility in case 2, and accordingly re-
search firms never experience the loss of δ but prefers paying scientist-employees the wage of w CI
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upon successful completion of a research project. The right-hand side of this expression is decreas-
ing in w CI , and thus a marginal increase in w
C
I lowers the value of µ that equalises profits in the two
regions. The reason is that an increase in monetary incentives to the scientist-employee is exactly
countervailed by a decrease in the incentives of the firm and moreover reduces the profitability of a
successful project. This means that, in contrast to case 1, tougher wage-competition makes some in-
dustries move to the NC-region even though the contribution of workers to research is actually more
important (µ< 12 ) than the contribution of firms.
As the figure illustrates for the two values of δ, the higher the cost to the research firm of losing an
experienced scientist, the tougher wage-competition is needed to make firms in the industry prefer
the C-region.
0
µ
0 w CI
1
2
1
4
1
3
ν 1
4
ν 1
3
ν
NC-region
C-region
The figure illustrates how the location decision of research firms depends on the parameters of the model. The choice of location is
independent of the costs of carrying out research as given byφ and λ.
Figure 2: Location
The previous analysis can be related to the results in other models of mobility induced knowledge
diffusion. One important result is due to Pakes and Nitzan (1983) who show that if wages are not con-
strained mobility-induced spillovers do not have an effect on research investments. In that setting,
the optimal wage contract specifies that the value of R&D-learning to a young scientist-employee is
deducted from first period wages. The present analysis shows that even if there is a lower limit on first
period wages such that firms cannot appropriate the full value of R&D-learning, wage-competition
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and mobility do not necessarily constrain R&D-output. On the contrary, it can have a positive effect
on the profitability of projects and the scientific output of an industry. This is a relevant result for
these advanced industries in which the value of sourcing technologies might by far exceed what can
be internalised in the labour market.15
4 Socially optimal location
This section discusses how the socially optimal location decision compares to the market equilib-
rium. I start by considering whether, from society’s point of view, a given project in industry µ should
be carried out in the NC-region or in the C-region. This amounts to letting the social planner decide
the location of industry µ and whether a project should be undertaken or not, but maintaining that
the social planner does not control neither the research-intensity of firms and scientist-employees
nor the entry decision of imitators. However, a full consideration of welfare in the two locations re-
quires that one takes into account the number of projects undertaken in each region and not only
welfare per project. This, I discuss in the subsequent section.
Before continuing, an additional remark is needed. The starting point for the analysis of this
paper is that new technological developments have value to the research firms, the scientists and
entering imitators. However, the combination of free entry of imitators and a homogeneous cost of
entry, F , implies that the value to imitators of copying technological know-how is competed away,
and therefore the total contribution of imitators to social welfare is zero in both locations. Hence, in
the following, only research firms and employees enter the analysis.16
4.1 Optimal location of a given project in industry µ
Expected utility to a scientist-employee in the C-region E (UC ) = w
C
I
λ

µ2(1−δ)+ (1−µ)2w CI2

is inde-
pendent of the project undertaken and positive17 whereas expected utility to workers in the NC-
region, E (U N C ) is zero. Accordingly, for a given µ, the difference in total welfare for a project un-
dertaken in the C-region and the NC-region is:
E (W Cr )−E (W N Cr ) = E (piCr )−E (piN Cr )+E (UC ) (21)
15Without borrowing constraints the tendency towards clustering in the C-region is even stronger. The welfare analysis in
the subsequent section illustrates this.
16With heterogenous cost of entry, some imitators would earn positive profits. In this case, one can re-interpret the welfare
analysis of this section as capturing that of a national planner who is not concerned with the welfare of foreign-owned
imitators when evaluating the pros and cons of labour market competition.
17This is the case as long as there is a threat of entry pushing the period 2 wage above zero, and is due to young scientist-
employees being borrowing constrained.
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Since E (UC ) is positive the social planner prefers the C-region to the NC-region whenever the firm
does (cases for which E (piCr )−E (piN Cr )> 0). It also implies that there are combinations ofµ and w CI for
which the social planner prefers the C-region even though firms choose to locate in the NC-region.
These are cases for which E (piCr )−E (piN Cr )< 0 is outweighed by E (UC )> 0.
A graphical illustration of how the decision of the social planner compares to the market equilib-
rium is given in figure 3. It is drawn for a loss from scientist mobility of δ = 13 . As in figure 2, ν , ν 13
represent combinations of µ and w CI that make the firm indifferent between the two locations. Sim-
ilarly, ω,ω represent combinations of w CI and µ which make the social planner indifferent between
the two locations (values of µ and w CI such that (21) is zero.).
Again,ω indicates that w CI >δ:
ω : {(µ, w CI )|1−δ+w
C
I
λ

µ2(1−δ)+ (1−µ)2w CI
− µ2(1−δ)2
2λ
− (1−µ)2(w
C
I )
2
2λ
− µ2
2λ
= 0} (22)
Again, for a given δ this is equivalent to combinations of the parameters such that:
µ2
(1−µ)2 =
2w CI (1−δ+ w
C
I
2 )
1− (1−δ)(1−δ+2w CI )
(23)
The above expression differs from equation (18) because the social planner takes into account that
w CI is not only a source of incentives and added research-efficiency but also a source of utility to
the scientist-employee. Rewriting the right-hand side of (18) to
2w CI (1−δ)
1−(1−δ)(1−δ) and comparing with the
right-hand side of expression (23), it is easily seen that the social planner for a given w CI > δ prefers
the C-region for industries with higher values of µ. Thus ω lies above ν . Moreover, the gap between
the socially optimal equilibrium and the market equilibrium is increasing in w CI for a given µ. The
reason is that E (UC ) is increasing in w CI .
Turning to the other case,ω reflects that w CI ≤δ:
ω : {(µ, w CI )| 1λ

µ2(1−w CI )+ (1−µ)2w CI
− µ2(1−w CI )2
2λ
− (1−µ)2(w
C
I )
2
2λ
− µ2
2λ
= 0} (24)
The relationship between µ and w CI is determined by:
µ2
(1−µ)2 =
2
w CI
−1 (25)
When δ ≤ w CI , there is no mobility in equilibrium, and the gain to workers from labour market
competition is exactly outweighed by the loss to the research firm as it ends up paying the research-
employee to stay during period 2. Consequently, the total value of a successful project that is jointly
realised by the firm and its scientist-employee is∆≡ 1 and hence independent of w CI .
Still, the socially optimal location varies with w CI , and this is because there is a gain from split-
ting costs due to the convex cost-functions. In other words, the choice of location is a choice between
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optimal distribution of monetary incentives (according toµ) and splitting costs. The gains from split-
ting costs are of course largest for intermediate values of µ, since for w CI close to one or close to zero,
only one of the parties has incentives to contribute to the research project.
The intuition behind the negative slope on ω is as follows. For low values of µ, the C-region is
of course always preferred as monetary incentives to the worker is more important than monetary
incentives to the firm. When µ= 12 both parties are equally efficient at carrying out research, and the
gains from splitting costs implies that the C-region is always preferred. As µ increases from 12 , the
value of locating in the NC-region in which the firm has the better incentives increases relative to the
gains from splitting costs.
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The figure illustrates the location decision of research firms and the socially optimal location. These are independent of the costs of
carrying out research as given byφ and λ. The socially optimal location is drawn for δ= 13 .
Figure 3: Socially optimal location for a given project in industry µ
4.2 Optimal location of an industry µ
The above analysis was useful for clarifying the sources of divergence between the equilibrium lo-
cation decision and the socially optimal location. Yet, it is more in line with reality that the social
planner only has power over the institutional setting and does not does decide if firms should un-
dertake projects or not. Therefore, this section considers the socially optimal location choice when
the social planner only controls the location decision of firms in an industry, and thus are forced to
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trade off gains from worker utility in the C-region against lower profitability of projects and thus fewer
research projects in the C-region.
The total difference in welfare between the two regions consists of three terms:
E (W CT )−E (W N CT ) =
∫ m i n{RC ,RN C }
0

E (piC )−E (piN C )+E (UC )d r
−
∫ m a x {RC ,RN C }
RC

E (piN C )−φrd r
+
∫ m a x {RC ,RN C }
RN C

E (piC )−φr +E (UC )d r (26)
where E (piC ), E (piN C ) are expected profits net of fixed costs of initiating a project. The first term cap-
tures the sum of the differences in welfare on projects that are profitable and thus undertaken in both
regions. The second term captures foregone welfare (i.e. profits to research firms) on projects that are
only undertaken if the industry is located in the C-region. Clearly this term is zero if E (piC )≥ E (piN C )
since then more projects are undertaken in the C-region and RC ≥ RN C . Equivalently, the last term
represents extra welfare on projects that are only undertaken in the C-region. This term is zero if
E (piC ) ≤ E (piN C ) for the equivalent reason. In contrast to the above analysis, the welfare-decision
now depends on the cost parameters φ and λ as the sizes of these affect the number of projects un-
dertaken.
If E (piC )≥ E (piN C ) both research firms and the social planner prefer the C-region to the NC-region
for a given project and expression (26) is positive. Thus, the interesting cases arise when E (piC ) <
E (piN C ), but E (piC )− E (piN C ) + E (UC ) > 0, and this is the case that I need to consider in order to
determine how the socially optimal region differs from the equilibrium choice of location. The third
term in expression (26) is then zero, and the expression can then be rewritten as:
E (W CT )−E (W N CT ) = E (pi
C )
φ
×E (piC )−E (piN C )+E (UC )
− E (piN C )−E (piC )
φ

E (piN C )− 1
2
φ2

(27)
The first line looks like equation (21), only the difference in welfare per project is multiplied by the
number of projects undertaken in the C-region. The last line captures lost welfare on projects that
would have been undertaken in the NC-region given by the number of "lost" projects ( E (pi
N C )−E (piC )
φ
)
times foregone profit on these projects. The term 12φ
2 is due to savings on the fixed cost of initiating
projects.
There is not a simple expression for the combinations of µ and w CI that make the social planner
indifferent between the two locations (make expression (27) zero), but figure 4 gives an example of
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how the socially optimal location decision differs from the optimal location decision of the firm for
δ = 13 , φ = 0.01 and λ = 2. υ 13 , υ represent combinations of µ and w
C
I for which the social planner
is indifferent between the two locations. Again, ν 1
3
, ν show how the equilibrium location decision of
research firms depends on µ, w CI .
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The figure gives an example of how the socially optimal location decision differs from the optimal location decision of the firm for
δ= 13 ,φ = 0.01 and λ= 2.
Figure 4: Socially optimal location for industry µ
Though, the figure is only drawn for chosen values of the cost-parameters18, it clearly illustrates
that taking into account the number of "lost" projects in cases for which the interests of the social
planner and the research firms differ, has important welfare implications. The area between υ 1
3
and
ν 1
3
, respectively υ and ν represent combinations of µ and w CI for which the social planner prefers
the C-region, but research firms prefer the NC-region. This area is markedly smaller than the equiv-
alent area in figure 3. At the same time, the figure highlights that as long as firm investments are not
too important relative to the contribution of the scientist-employee, there are gains to welfare if the
industry cannot use non-compete clause. In these cases, profits and thereby the number of projects
only decrease a little if the industry cannot use non-compete clauses.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this section, a further source of welfare in the C-region that
I have not considered would be positive profit to imitators. However, the same line of reasoning as
18In reality, small changes inφ does not matter much to υ 1
3
, υ.
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used above with respect to figure 4 applies to this situation. Positive profits to imitators would play a
similar role as positive utility to scientist-employees in the previous analysis. It makes the C-region
more attractive from a global perspective, but forcing industries to refrain from using non-compete
clauses would be at the cost of lowering the number of projects undertaken in the industry.
5 Conclusion
Recent empirical investigations have established that research and development activities by multi-
national companies in foreign locations do not only serve the purpose of adapting core technologies
to local markets but are increasingly undertaken in order to source technologies from the leading sci-
ence centres of the world. The purpose of this paper is to study the response of research firms in the
donor region to such activities.
For the purpose of this paper, I model the sourcing of technologies as imitative activities. Several
authors have argued that the tacitness of knowledge and technological know-how at early stages of
a technology’s life-cycle make hiring an important way of learning about new technological devel-
opments. This paper takes its starting point from this observation and suggests that labour market
competition among a group of imitators for technological know-how embodied in people generate
positive incentives for young scientist-employees to contribute effort to a research project.
In the model, innovation requires the joint effort of the research-firm and a scientist-employee.
The threat of future imitation via employee-mobility is detrimental to the incentives of the research
firm because it lowers the value of a successful research project, but it has a positive impact on the in-
centives of the scientist. The reason is that entry of imitators create an alternative labour market that
protects the scientist-employee against the opportunism of the research firm. Thereby, the analysis
shows that even if there is a lower limit on first period wages such that firms cannot appropriate the
full value of R&D-learning, wage-competition and mobility do not necessarily constrain R&D-output.
On the contrary, it can have a positive effect on the profitability of projects and the scientific output
of an industry. This is a relevant result for advanced research intensive industries in which the value
of sourcing technologies might by far exceed what can be internalised in the labour market.
The loss to the research firm from losing a scientist-employee to an imitator determines the max-
imum wage that a research firm is willing to pay to retain a scientist upon completion of a research
project. It is independent of the toughness of wage-competition among imitators and entry of a large
number of imitators serves to push wages to experienced scientists above this critical level. This
generates mobility and transfer of know-how to the imitating sector, but it also increases the joint
monetary incentives of the research firm and the scientist-employee to invest in the research project.
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I argue that the beneficial effects of wage-competition are likely to be present in the multi-purpose
technologies of the computer industry.
The model has implications for the optimality of allowing for non-compete clauses in employ-
ment contracts. It is often emphasised that the lack of enforcement of such clauses by Californian
courts has contributed significantly to the success of the computer industry in Silicon Valley. Locat-
ing in such a region is attractive to a research intensive industry if labour market competition con-
tributes positively to the profitability of projects. Even though I do not formally model the reasoning,
I argue that prior to entry, imitators might find it difficult to learn if covenants are in use or not, for
example because they do not know exactly the type or research-technology that characterises the in-
dustry. In this case, it is easier for a research intensive industry to attract imitators if they locate in a
region in which covenants are not enforced by courts because this sends a clear signal that hiring is
ex post possible.19
At the same time the welfare analysis shows that even though tough wage-competition to some
extent serves to aline the interests of the social planner and the research sector, there are industries for
which the socially optimal location differs from the equilibrium location. The social planner prefers
research to be undertaken in the region in which covenants are not enforced whenever it is optimal
for the industry, but also prefers it for a wider set of industries than induced by the location equilib-
rium. The reason is that the social planner takes into account the utility of scientist-employees who
are able to capitalise on successful projects when imitators compete for their know-how.
19Technology spillovers between research firms is also a factor that contributes to the attractiveness of regions in which
firms do not use non-compete clauses.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if firms agglomerate to hire from a common pool
of labour. I use Danish register data with detailed plant-level information on yearly employment
numbers, geographical location, and workers’ education to test two formal arguments. The first
of these is the labour pooling argument due to Krugman (1991). It states that firms form industrial
clusters in order to iron out idiosyncratic productivity shocks because geographical closeness fa-
cilitates mobility of workers from low to high productivity firms. As in Overman and Puga (2009),
I use a measure based on plant-level employment changes to account for the industry’s scope for
labour pooling, but I adapt the measure to an economy of a small scale like the Danish economy.
An alternative theory proposes that competition for skills among multiple firms in the same lo-
cation induces workers to invest in their human capital because workers expect a return to their
investment. Hence, this idea proposes that similarity in the use of skills leads firms to locate in
geographical vicinity. I use a functional definition of skills that distinguishes workers according
to both length and field of education, and I use correlations between the skill mix at the plant
and the rest of the industry to determine how homogeneous the industry is in its use of skills.
The findings are in support of the idea in Krugman (1991), but the idea that firms locate together
because it increases the skill level of workers does not find support in the data. However, the
data shows that similarity in formal qualifications play a role in relation to the ability of firms to
re-allocate workers. In an extension, I find that this is even more the case in the diverse, urban
labour market compared to specialised industrial clusters.
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1 Introduction
In a recent review, Puga (2010) summarises empirical work on the magnitudes and causes of agglom-
eration economies and concludes that a doubling of city size leads to a productivity increase of be-
tween 3 and 8 %. Hence, the existence of agglomeration economies is well-established. At the same
time, more work is needed to understand the exact mechanisms that create advantages to firms and
workers in large and dense cities, and on this background this paper test a prominent theory in the
economic geography literature stating that firms form industrial clusters to share a common pool of
labour.
In his Principles from 1890, Alfred Marshall identified three motives for industrial agglomeration;
to access local suppliers, to benefit from technology spillovers, and to gain from sharing a common
pool of labour (see Marshall (1961)). Since then, extensive theoretical work has been done to for-
malise and extend these and related ideas (see Duranton and Puga (2004) for an overview)1. In the
empirical literature, much effort has been devoted to identifying the existence and impact of localised
technology spillovers (e.g. Jaffe et al. (1993), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Zucker et al. (1998),
Keller (2002)), and, likewise, authors have documented localised vertical linkages by linking location
to flows of goods and services (Holmes (1999), Rosenthal and Strange (2001), and Overman and Puga
(2009)). In contrast, and in spite of formal work on the topic, much less is known about the empirical
significance of labour pooling. This is not less noticeable as the motive applies to a broad set of skills
and industries, having a potentially large economic impact on local economies.
Ellison et al. (2010) and Overman and Puga (2009) are two recent empirical papers addressing the
labour pooling hypothesis. The work of Ellison et al. (2010) suggests that a similar occupational mix
of two industries is an agglomerating factor, and Overman and Puga (2009) find that industries com-
posed of plants with a large idiosyncratic component in labour demand form industrial clusters. This
paper adds to this line of research. I use a very detailed employer-employee data set for the Danish
manufacturing industry to combine information on the formal education of workers with plant-level
employment changes to study the role of labour pooling in agglomeration. First and foremost, it al-
lows me to consider the relative importance of an uncorrelated labour demand and a homogeneous
skill mix for agglomeration which is new to the literature. Moreover, using formal qualifications of
the labour force to account for skills sheds light on a different – but equally important – dimension of
human capital compared to a functional definition.
Marshall observed that a large labour market for workers with similar skills is an advantage to
1Rather than keeping to the original grouping by input-type; labour, suppliers, and ideas, Duranton and Puga (2004) em-
phasise that similar mechanisms are at play across all three of these, and the authors group these under the headings;
sharing, matching, and learning externalities.
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both workers and firms in the sense that it offers ’a constant market for skills’. This idea is formalised
in Krugman (1991) who considers the location decision of establishments and workers in sectors that
are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In this model, establishments can either locate in
isolation or in an industrial cluster. The key point is that in isolation, employment changes at the es-
tablishment level affect local wages making it difficult for the establishment to expand in response to
a positive productivity shock whereas clustering facilitates mobility of workers from low-productivity
firms to high-productivity firms. Therefore, clustering of similar firms with a large idiosyncratic com-
ponent in labour demand, increases the elasticity of labour supply which makes it easier for the firm
to expand in good times.
Overman and Puga (2009) test this hypothesis on a panel of workers and plants in UK manufac-
turing. As a novel measure of the industry’s scope for labour market pooling, the authors suggest cal-
culating the average difference between yearly relative changes in industry employment and yearly
relative changes in plant employment. This provides a proxy for the degree of idiosyncracy of shocks
in the industry which can then be related to its pattern of location.
An analysis based on the present data set requires a measure suitable for an economy with many
small plants, and therefore I use an adjusted version of the measure suggested in Overman and Puga
(2009). Rather than looking at relative changes, I suggest calculating deviations between the absolute
change in the employment of a plant and the average absolute change in employment of all plants
in the industry. In this way, I avoid inflating the contribution of employment expansions relative to
employment contractions at small plants.
An important assumption in Overman and Puga (2009) is that same-industry plants depend on
the same type of skills in production. This is probably a good approximation in many industries,
but one can think of examples for which this is not the case. For example, low-tech and high-tech
production plants might have little scope for sharing labour despite belonging to the same industry.
Therefore, I consider how the tendency of same-industry plants to agglomerate varies across indus-
tries characterised by low and high levels of similarity in the mix of formal qualifications in the labour
force.
I measure homogeneity in formal qualifications within the industry by grouping workers accord-
ing to both level and field of their highest education, and I use correlations between the skill mix at
the plant and the rest of the industry to determine how homogeneous the industry is in its use of
skills.
A similar need for skills might in itself be a reason for plants to agglomerate. This is the case
in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) in which competition for skilled labour among multiple firms in
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the same location protects workers against the opportunism of their employers thereby encouraging
investments in human capital. This line of thinking suggests a separate, positive effect of a similar
skill use on the tendency of plants to agglomerate.2
Dumais et al. (1997)3 and Ellison et al. (2010) already find that two industries with a similar mix
of occupations tend to locate together, and I add to their findings by investigating whether this result
carries over to formal qualifications and within industries.
The outcome variable is observed agglomeration of 4-digit NACE-industries. In the main analysis,
I consider co-location of same-industry plants as measured by the Ellison-Glaeser index (Ellison and
Glaeser (1997)) used by many to study industrial agglomeration. It is calculated from knowledge of
administrative geographic units and measures agglomeration arising from industry-level factors, i.e.
by using this index one takes into account any uneven distribution of general economic advantages
across locations, and controlling for the size distribution of plants.
To control for alternative determinants of agglomeration at the industry level relating to natural
resource use, transport costs, technology spillovers, and vertical linkages, I supplement the Danish
register data with data from input-output tables from Statistics Denmark and the OECD ANBERD
database, and I seek to control for the human capital intensity of the industry by including the indus-
try’s share of workers with a Bachelor’s degree or higher in the regressions.
The overall finding is that a large idiosyncratic component in labour demand among same-industry
plants is correlated with the formation of industry-specific clusters. This finding is robust across a
number of different specifications and is supportive of the results in Overman and Puga (2009) for
UK-industries while at the same time adding to the literature by suggesting that the labour pooling
argument is important also at the far smaller geographic scale of the Danish economy.
The data confirms that same-industry plants that are similar both in terms of the formal qualifica-
tions of the labour force and have an idiosyncratic labour demand have a higher tendency to cluster
than other plants. I distinguish industries according to three levels of the skill correlation measure,
and I find that this effect is most evident when comparing heterogenous industries to industries that
are moderately similar in terms of the formal qualifications of their labour force.
One explanation for this finding is that I use a rather detailed educational measure to account for
skill similarity in the industry, taking into account both level and field. For example, I distinguish be-
tween engineering degrees in machinery, chemistry and electronics. If workers are in fact substitutes
across these groups then industries gain only little in terms of labour pooling from being very simi-
2Almazan et al. (2007) introduce human capital formation in Krugman’s model. The tendency to cluster is strongest when
workers bear the cost of human capital investments, and there is a lot of variation in firm-level productivity shocks.
3I refer to the working paper version as the relevant part is excluded from the final version of the paper; Dumais et al.
(2002).
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lar. In the robustness section, I carry out the analysis assuming that workers are substitutes across a
wider set of fields than in the main analysis, and in this section I find that the effect of skill similarity
on the tendency to agglomerate for same-industry plants is most evident at higher values of the skill
correlation measure.
At the same time, a similar use of skills does not by itself have an impact on the tendency to locate
in specialised industrial clusters. Thus, ideas in line with those put forward in Rotemberg and Saloner
(2000) are not supported by the findings in this data set.
In an extension, I turn to an analysis of location in urban labour markets. In general, local labour
markets that evolve around a single industry and an urban, diverse labour market are thought to differ
in their dynamics, and it is interesting to investigate whether sharing of labour plays a role in urban
labour markets. The idea in this analysis is that labour sharing takes place between the industry and
the rest of manufacturing rather than within the industry.
In this analysis the dependent variable is the share of industry employment in the Greater Copen-
hagen area.4 Moreover, instead of comparing each plant to the other plants in the industry, I com-
pare each industry to all of manufacturing, both with respect to the Overman and Puga (2009)-index
of labour pooling and with respect to the composition of formal qualifications. I find that industries
with a large idiosyncratic component in labour demand relative to manufacturing are more urban
than other industries. However, since the reference industry is broadly defined, taking into account
the similarity in skill use relative to the rest of manufacturing is important. The results indicate that
industries with both an uncorrelated labour demand relative to all of manufacturing and with a skill
composition that resembles manufacturing have a significantly higher tendency to agglomerate in
urban areas than other industries. Moreover, this effect seems stronger than in the analysis on spe-
cialised industrial clusters.
Turning to the related literature, a number of benefits of a common labour pool has been sug-
gested. Helsley and Strange (1990) provide a formal model showing that the quality of a match be-
tween workers and firms is higher in larger markets. Similarly, Henderson (1974) and Henderson and
Becker (2000) incorporate gains from specialisation at the firm and individual level into an urban
framework. Finally, the idea that worker mobility facilitates diffusion of new technological know-how
is prominent in the theoretical literature on localised technology spillovers (e.g. Pakes and Nitzan
(1983), Combes and Duranton (2006)), and, by a related line of reasoning, Glaeser (1999) argues that
cities promote exchange of skills from experienced workers to young workers.5
4In the sample period, around one fourth of the manufacturing labour force was located in the Greater Copenhagen area
compared to around one tenth in the commuting area around the second largest city, Århus. The aim of limiting the
definition to the labour market around Copenhagen is to focus the analysis on a diverse metropolitan area.
5Here, I only provide selected references. The handbook chapter by Duranton and Puga (2004) provides a detailed overview
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As hinted to above, most empirical work on agglomeration concerns localised spillovers. The
work of Zucker, Darby and co-authors (e.g. Zucker et al. (1998)) links the development of new high-
tech industries to mobility of star scientists, and Kim and Marschke (2005) find that industries with
high rates of engineer-mobility also patent more in order to protect their knowledge base. Moretti
(2004) considers human capital spillovers rather than technology spillovers and shows that the share
of college-educated workers in a city has a positive effect on the productivity of plants in that city.
Evidence of gains from matching and specialisation is more scarce and generally comes from look-
ing at specific groups of professionals. With respect to matching, Gan and Li (2004)’s study of the
academic job market for new PhDs in Economics suggests that a field with more job openings and
more candidates offers a higher probability of matching. Also, an often cited work on specialisa-
tion is Baumgardner (1988) who finds that physicians perform a narrower range of activities in large
markets. The study in this paper addresses a different source of agglomeration, labour sharing, and
moreover uses an extensive panel on plants and workers covering all of Danish manufacturing.
Finally, this paper compares levels of agglomeration across industries. Dumais et al. (2002) study
changes in the spatial concentration of US-industries from 1972 to 1992, and one of their motivations
is to investigate whether equilibrium mechanisms of the kind discussed in this paper or historical
accidents determine today’s location of plants. The authors look at the geographic mobility of indus-
tries by decomposing changes in industry geographic concentration into a mean reversion part and
a dispersion part. For 5-year periods, they find that even though the overall concentration measure
never changes by more than 4%, industry mobility amounts to 8-16% in both directions pointing
to plant-mobility and equilibrium mechanisms as important for today’s pattern of agglomeration.
Barrios et al. (2005) reproduce this analysis for Portuguese and Irish manufacturing over the years
1985-1998 and likewise find persistent overall patterns of agglomeration but large magnitudes of un-
derlying industry mobility.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I introduce the data set and explain the
empirical variables. Section 3 contains the results. It consists of two subsections. In the first, I present
the results on industrial agglomeration, and, in the second, I move on to discuss urbanisation. Sec-
tion 4 contains robustness checks, and, finally, I conclude in section 5.
2 Data
I combine data from three sources. For the main variables of interest; geographic concentration,
labour market pooling, and the education-based variables, I use register data from the integrated
of the literature.
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database for labour market research (IDA) that is provided by Statistics Denmark. To calculate control
variables for other important determinants of industrial agglomeration related to natural resource
use, transport costs, and supplier linkages, I supplement the register data set with information from
the input-output tables from Statistics Denmark. Finally, I draw information on R&D expenditures
from the OECD ANBERD database.
The analysis is at the level of the industry, but the key variables of interest are calculated from
plant and worker information. Importantly, the register data contain plant level information on
yearly employment levels, information on the municipality and industry that plant j belongs to, and
detailed educational information on the employees at plant j .
Plants are classified into industries according to a 6-digit code of which the first 4 digits corre-
spond to the EU NACE-codes (In this paper, I use DB93 which corresponds to NACE rev 1). To facili-
tate comparison with other studies and to ensure that industries have a certain size, I classify plants
according to the first 4 digits. Bertinelli and Decop (2005) likewise choose NACE 4 as their industry
definition for Belgian manufacturing. The authors support their choice with a detailed discussion of
the issues involved, and I will come back to their main points in the subsequent section.6,7
The analysis covers all manufacturing plants (DB93 150000-372000) in years 1992 to 2006. Ear-
lier than 1992, the industry-code is less detailed and only allows for 36 subgroups in manufacturing
compared to more than 220 subgroups from 1992 and onwards. There are 256,829 plant-year obser-
vations in the raw data, and I observe each plant 5.8 times on average. Table 1 shows the development
in selected summary statistics for the manufacturing industry from 1992 to 2006.
6Note that only industries consisting of more than one plant add to the analysis in a meaningful way. For the 4-digit
industries, there are some one-plant industries, and I leave these out of the analysis.
7The industry classification system underwent a revision in 2003. The revision has implications for the industry-codes
from 2004 and onward. However, within manufacturing this only has implications for 29.40.00: Manufacturing of machine
tools which was split into three groups 29.41.00 29.42.00 29.43.00. I re-classify these under the 29.40.00 group. The main
part of the revision concerned services, but as I only use the industry-classification for services to calculate 1992-1999
concentration-measures this has no effect on the analysis.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the Danish manufacturing industry
1992-2006
1992 1997 2001 2006
Manufacturing employment (1000) 397.8 411.2 402.2 349.8
Industry average plant size:
Mean 36.2 38.7 41.9 35.4
Median 23.1 24.9 26.9 24.0
10t h percentile 6.0 5.0 6.0 5.4
90t h percentile 66.0 83.7 102.3 79.8
Industry number of plants:
Mean 78.3 71.3 67.1 60.6
Median 29.0 25.0 23.5 21.0
10t h percentile 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
90t h percentile 205.0 180.0 159.0 143.0
Employment numbers in the table are based on full-time equivalents.
Total manufacturing employment increases in the first half of the period but then falls by 13%
from 402.2 to 349.8 thousand full-time equivalents. The overall picture is that there are a few indus-
tries with on average large plants and many industries consisting of small and medium-sized plants.
The number of plants per industry also varies heavily. Both are factors that I need to take into ac-
count when I carry out the analysis. Below, I define and explain the variables that I construct for the
analysis. Summary statistics of these are provided in table 3 of subsection 2.5.
2.1 Measures of localisation and urbanisation
I consider two types of location decisions: locating in an industry-specific cluster (localisation) and
locating in a dense metropolitan environment (urbanisation). This section contains a discussion of
the issues involved in assessing geographic concentration.
2.1.1 The Ellison-Glaeser index of geographic concentration
As a measure of localisation of industry, I use the Ellison-Glaeser index of geographic concentration
(hereafter EG-index) due to Ellison and Glaeser (1997). This index measures concentration of the
industry in excess of what would be expected from the industrial concentration and the geographic
distribution of overall manufacturing activities. To see this, it is useful to sketch the derivation of the
index.8
The authors define an index of raw concentration G i =
∑
l (x l − x l i )2 that measures the extent
to which employment in industry i is more or less geographically concentrated than manufacturing
employment as a whole. x l measures location l ’s share of total manufacturing employment, and
8Here, I follow the presentation in Bertinelli and Decop (2005).
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x l i is location l ’s share of manufacturing employment in industry i . If there are no agglomeration
economies, and regions are equally attractive in terms of natural resources then G i should be pro-
portional to industry i ’s industrial concentration Hi . They write the expectation ofG i as:
E (G i ) = (1−
∑
l
x 2l )[Hi +γ(1−Hi )] (1)
where Hi =
∑
j z
2
j is a Herfindahl index of the J plants in the industry with z j being the employment
share of the j th plant. The parameter γ captures excess concentration arising from dependency on
natural resources or advantages associated with agglomeration economies. By isolating γ, the au-
thors derive their index of agglomeration:
EG i ≡ γˆi = G i − (1−
∑
l x
2
l )Hi
(1−∑l x 2l )(1−Hi ) (2)
The term (1−∑l x 2l ) ensures that the expected value of EG i is zero if the distribution of the industry’s
employment across locations matches the distribution of total manufacturing employment taking
into account Hi . A positive value of EG i indicates that the industry is spatially more concentrated
than would be expected if plant locations were random whereas a negative value indicates that it is
less spatially concentrated. In a perfectly competitive industry with a large number of small plants,
Hi is close to zero, and in this case EG i is close to
G i
(1−∑l x 2l ) .
In the data, the administrative units of the 275 Danish municipalities that existed until January
1st 2007 constitute the geographic information.9 As the purpose of this paper is to account for
agglomeration-effects related to the labour market, I aggregate the 275 municipalities to 27 com-
muting areas and use these as my geographic units.10 This is in line with Overman and Puga (2009)
who use UK Travel to Work Areas and, moreover, in agreement with the directions provided in Barrios
et al. (2003) and Bertinelli and Decop (2005) on how to apply the EG-index to small-size countries.
These are studies on Belgian, Portuguese, and Irish manufacturing, and in both of them the authors
prefer results based on regional geographical units over smaller municipalities. The regional units
amount to 43 districts in Belgium, 18 districts in Portugal, and 27 counties in Ireland.
Using larger geographical units helps to address two short-comings of the EG-index. First, it limits
problems with spatial auto-correlation due to disagreements between administrative and economic
boundaries (Barrios et al. (2003)). Note that using commuting areas as the geographic unit further
mitigates this concern as it improves agreement between economic and geographic boundaries. Sec-
ond, it addresses a second issue associated with an upward bias in the measure for industries com-
9To be exact, the number was reduced to 271 in 2003 and to 270 in 2006. After January 1st 2007, the number of municipali-
ties is 98 due to a reform of the local government structure and, thus, the administrative units that I refer to are identical to
the structure prior to this date.
10I use commuting areas as defined by the Ministry of the Environment, in SPD (2006).
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posed of only a few plants. Kim et al. (2000) argue that whenever the number of plants in an industry
is smaller than the number of spatial units, the EG-index is upward biased. I come back to this issue
when I consider the robustness of my results in section 4.
The upper part of table 2 summarises the development in the concentration indices in the time
period of interest. In Ellison and Glaeser (1997), the authors note that there is no obvious value of
γ that can be associated with significant departures from a random allocation. In that paper, the
authors themselves distinguish between three levels: not very concentrated (γ< 0.02), relatively con-
centrated (0.02 < γ < 0.05), and highly concentrated (γ > 0.05). According to these definitions, the
Danish manufacturing industry shows high levels of concentration and much higher levels than those
reported by Ellison and Glaeser as well as in other studies for the US.
In an empirical study based on US state, county and zip-code units Rosenthal and Strange (2001)
find that industries tend to show less concentration on a more detailed geographical scale. There-
fore, even though it is informative to compare levels of geographic concentration across countries,
this requires some caution, and, in particular, it suggests that patterns of agglomeration in countries
of similar size are more comparable than if countries are heterogeneous in terms of size. The num-
bers in table 2 are of similar magnitude as those found in Barrios et al. (2005) for 4-digit industries in
Portugal in years 1985-1998. In the same study the authors find that average concentration of manu-
facturing in Ireland measured by the EG-index is around 0.03. However, the development over time in
their sample contrasts that for Danish manufacturing in years 1992-2006 as they observe decreasing
levels of concentration whereas the average EG-index increases for Danish industries.
Table 2: Mean levels of geographic concentration 1992-2006
1992 1997 2001 2006
EG-Index (EG ) 0.047 0.051 0.097 0.100
Raw geographic concentration (G) 0.235 0.238 0.244 0.251
Plant Herfindahl (H) 0.221 0.222 0.228 0.229
Conc. of manufacturing (
∑
l x
2
l ) 0.145 0.133 0.130 0.128
Employment weighted EG-index 0.057 0.079 0.087 0.103
Urbanisation 0.276 0.253 0.248 0.227
The table reports means of the EG index of geographic concentration and three compo-
nents: A raw concentration index, a Herfindahl index of plant-level concentration of em-
ployment, and a measure of the geographic concentration of manufacturing. Employment-
numbers are full-time equivalents. It also include the measure of urbanisation, see subsec-
tion 2.1.2.
In the table, I include all industries with a Herfindahl less than 1 in the reported year.
2.1.2 Urbanisation
In addition to industrial agglomeration, I wish to investigate whether plants locate in a diverse, urban
area to hire from a broad set of manufacturing skills. Therefore, I consider an alternative index of
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geographic concentration; the sample fraction of industry employment in an urban area.
Around one fourth of Danish manufacturing employment is located in the Greater Copenhagen
area compared to one tenth around the second largest city of Århus. My preferred definition of a
thick and diverse urban labour market is therefore the labour market around Copenhagen.11 In the
years 1992 to 2006, manufacturing employment in the Greater Copenhagen area falls with 21.6% from
102,298 to 80,117 full-time equivalents. This is a decrease above what was found for manufacturing
as a whole. The lower part of table 2 summarises this development in the gradually decreasing index
of urbanisation.
The index of urbanisation are simple compared to the EG-index. When measuring localisation of
industries, the concern is that scale economies at the plant level show up as spatial localisation if one
neglects to control for the degree of concentration in the industry, but measuring urbanisation does
not lead to similar concerns. The urban index can for any industry that consists of two or more plants
take on any value between 0 and 1. However, in section 4, I check whether the results are sensitive to
controlling for industry concentration and the average size of plants in the estimations.
2.2 Measure of the potential for labourmarket pooling
Overman and Puga (2009) develop the link between the labour pooling model of Krugman (1991)
and empirical work. They consider a multi-location setting in which establishments are exposed to a
productivity shock after they as well as workers have chosen their location.12 In the industry, there is a
continuum of workers and a discrete number of establishments operating under decreasing returns
to scale. This is essential for generating the labour pooling effect as it implies that establishment
profits are convex in the productivity shock. Finally, the industry is characterised by the magnitude
of idiosyncratic productivity shocks across its establishments.
The key point is that in an isolated labour market wages are heavily affected by changes in em-
ployment at the establishment whereas in a location with many other plants workers can easily
move from low-productivity establishments to high-productivity establishments which helps keep-
ing wages constant facilitating an expansion of production in good times. In this sense, the advantage
of an industrial cluster is that productivity shocks are ironed out instead of being heavily reflected in
local wages, and this increases expected profits.
When establishments choose their location they trade off this advantageous effect of clustering
against a negative effect from a tighter labour market as more establishments per worker pushes the
11I use the definition in SPD (2006). The Greater Copenhagen area consists of the municipalities of Copenhagen and Fred-
eriksberg as well as a number of smaller municipalities surrounding Copenhagen.
12Here, I refer to the version in which firms and workers choose their location simultaneously. The authors also consider an
alternative definition with a fixed labour pool in each location but with free entry of firms.
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general wage-level up. The authors show that the more uncorrelated productivity shocks are, the
stronger is the tendency towards agglomeration.
To test this prediction, Overman and Puga (2009) suggest calculating, for any given year and plant,
the absolute value of the difference between the percentage change in the plant’s employment and
the percentage change in the industry’s employment, and then for each industry average across years
and plants. I use a slightly modified version of the measure in that paper:
Pool PIi =
1
T
∑
t
1
J
∑
j
(
1
E j
|d j − d¯ i |) (3)
where subscript i denotes industry and j denotes plant. J is the number of plants, T number of years,
d j measures plant absolute changes in employment and d¯ i =
d i
J is the industry average absolute
change in employment. Finally, E j is average employment at the plant in year t − 1 and t . In this
application, employment is given by full-time equivalents rather than number of employees at each
plant in order to account for part-time workers.
The measure is zero if plant-level changes in employment exactly mimic changes in industry em-
ployment, and it is increasing in the degree of idiosyncracy of changes. Observing a positive rela-
tionship between this measure and the degree of agglomeration of the industry is consistent with the
hypothesis that industry employment is concentrated because it improves plants’ ability to adapt to
positive and negative shocks. As alternative specifications, I define Pool PM as the equivalent index
for plants relative to manufacturing, and likewise Pool IM for the industry relative to manufacturing.
The difference compared to the measure suggested in Overman and Puga (2009) is that, instead
of comparing relative changes, I compare the absolute change in employment at plant j with the
industry mean-absolute change. To be able to compare the size of shocks across plants, I weigh each
observation with the average size of the plant across year t − 1 and t . The motivation behind using
absolute changes is that expression (3) allows for changes from zero and is less sensitive with respect
to changes from small levels of employment. This makes it better suitable for an analysis based on
the present data set. There are many small plants in the data and a significant amount of entry. The
latter are observations that I avoid losing by taking this approach.13 However, note, that by writing
Pool PIi =
1
T
∑
t
1
J
∑
j (|d jE j − d iJ ∗E j |), it is seen that for industries composed of plants of equal size my
measure is very similar to the Overman and Puga (2009)-measure. In this case, the only adjustment
is to allow for entering plants as I view employment-changes relative to the average size of the plant
instead of relative to lagged employment.
13Statistics Denmark assigns an identical identifier to a workplace in two consecutive years if one of three criteria are ful-
filled: 1) same owner + same industry, 2) same owner + same workforce, 3) same workforce + same industry and/or ad-
dress. Thus, only when all of these three criteria are violated do I observe exit or entry.
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2.3 Measuring the skill-composition of the industry’s labour input
This section defines an index that compares the skillmix of plants with the industry, and equivalently
the skillmix of the industry with total manufacturing. The hypothesis is that a similar use of skills is
favourable to agglomerations because it allows plants to form a common pool of labour.
Other authors have constructed measures of the skill-match of the industry relative to other in-
dustries or to the local economic environment in order to determine the scope for labour pooling
(see Dumais et al. (1997), Henderson (2003), and Ellison et al. (2007)). The novelty of this paper is to
use formal educations to define skills and to include a measure of the average similarity of the plant
relative to the industry.
I start by considering whether an industry consists of plants that, in terms of skill use, are on
average similar to or different from the rest of the industry:
Cor r PIi =
1
J
∑
j
∑
e

l j e − 1n i

l−j e − 1n i

Ç∑
e

l j e − 1n i
2Ç∑
e

l−j e − 1n i
2 (4)
where e indexes skill group, and n i is the number of skill groups in the industry. l j e denotes the share
of workers at plant j in skill group e , and l−j e is the share of workers in skill group e in the rest of the
industry.14 I use superscript PI to indicate that the index measures correlation of the plants relative
to the industry. In a similar fashion, I calculate how correlated the skill mix of the industry is with the
distribution of skills in all of manufacturing. I refer to this index as Cor r IM .
The educational variable is based on yearly reportings to Statistics Denmark from the educational
institutions, and it indicates the highest level of education for each worker at plant j in any given year.
It is an 8-digit code of which the first two digits indicate length of education from primary school to
PhD, and digit 3 to 8 represent field (higher digits are nested in lower digit-groups). The aim in this
paper is to group workers with respect to education in a way that captures substitutability from the
point of view of firms. The challenge is the difficulty of assessing exactly which groups of workers are
substitutes, and moreover that substitutability might differ across fields.
I have chosen the 6t h digit as my preferred level of detail. In the years 1993 to 1999 (the sample
years from which industry characteristics are calculated), the number of 6-digit groups represented
in manufacturing increases from 269 to 308. At the 6t h digit, fields of engineering at both the Bach-
elor’s and Master’s level are divided into machinery, chemistry, electronics, etc., and one can, to a
reasonable extent, distinguish between languages studied. Likewise, sociologists, political scientists,
and economists are separately grouped. The risk of choosing a more specialised classification is to
14As information on education is per individual worker independently of hours worked, I use head-count as my measure of
total employment. This is different from the labour pooling measure for which I use full-time equivalents.
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treat degrees that are in fact very close substitutes as dissimilar. In the robustness section, I carry out
the analysis using the 4t h and the 8t h digit, and discuss how the results are affected.15 ,16
Unfortunately, educational information is missing for about 4% of of workers. Rather than ex-
cluding these from the calculations, I have chosen to treat a missing educational code as a separate
skill group.
2.4 Controlling for other forces of agglomeration
The location decision of establishments are affected by a multiple of factors ranging from the avail-
ability of inputs and skills to the cost of transporting goods to the market. In this section, I briefly
introduce the set of controls, but also refer to the discussion of these in the results section.
From the register data set, I calculate the industry share of workers with a Bachelor’s degree or
higher and include these in the regressions. This is a standard variable to include in studies of ag-
glomeration, and most studies find a strong positive relationship between this variable and agglom-
eration. The analysis of this paper characterises the labour market in more detail compared to what
is usually the case, and the expectation is that this, to some degree, moderates the importance of this
variable in explaining agglomeration. In this analysis, the variable captures effects relating to better
conditions for workers and firms to find a good match as well as to learning externalities.
The human capital intensity might also capture how technologically advanced an industry is. A
number of theories predict clustering of plants because it facilitates transmissions of technological
know-how, i.e. via labour mobility. However, I seek to separately control for the role of technology and
knowledge spillovers in forming industrial clusters and urban areas by including R&D expenditures
as share of value added. The data source for R&D expenditures is OECD’s ANBERD database, and one
should note that it is only available at the 2-digit industry level (18 manufacturing industries).
The input-output tables from Statistics Denmark and industry value added from the national
accounts allow me to control for the role of natural advantages, transport costs and vertical linkages.
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) carefully define relevant variables, and I take their paper as my starting
point.17
15When I calculate the plant skill composition, I restrict the employee-educational observations to workers for whom Statis-
tics Denmark reports that their main occupation is with the respective plant. This excludes workers for whom the main
occupation is at a different workplace either as a wage-earner or as a self-employee. This, however, does not in general
exclude part-time employees.
16The short-coming of this method is that workers who are hired on grounds different from the educational background are
classified wrongly. For example, a formally trained hairdresser who does manual work at a manufacturing plant enters in
the measure as a hairdresser, but to the extent that he does not use his formally acquired skills he should be grouped with
other unskilled workers.
17The Danish Input-Output tables use a 130 industry classification of which 55 are manufacturing industries. Two manu-
facturing industries cannot be separated at the 4t h digit (Industrial production of bread: 158109 and bakery stores: 158120),
and I sum the input-variable for these. Accordingly, I end up with 54 manufacturing industries, and I assign the same value
94
The variables ’Primary input as share of value added’, ’Energy as share of value added’, and ’Water
as share of value added’ capture reliance on natural resources, and price differences on water and
energy across regions. Dependency on one or more of these inputs could lead to industrial clustering.
However my expectation is that these factors are weaker predictors of location in a country of the size
of Denmark than in the US and UK which are the countries analysed in the referenced paper.
Industries that depend on producers of intermediates have an incentive to cluster near these
plants. I seek to capture this by including ’Manufactured input as share of value added’ and ’Service
input as share of value added’ in the analysis.
These variables, however, do not depend on whether suppliers are in fact geographically concen-
trated or not. Overman and Puga (2009) improve on this by including an input-share weighted sum
of the EG-index across all industries to capture the spatial concentration of suppliers:
Vi =
∑
k 6=i
I i kEGk (5)
where I i k is the value of industry i ’s input purchased from industry k relative to value added in in-
dustry i , and EGk is the EG-index of industry k .
In this analysis, an alternative is to replace the EG-index of geographic concentration with G i =∑
l (x l − x l i )2; the measure of raw geographic concentration. The idea behind the EG-index is to
measure geographic concentration that arises from factors external to the plant, and therefore it is
important to adjust for the part of geographic concentration that arises from a highly concentrated
industrial structure. If production of intermediates takes place only at a few large suppliers then this
could also be an agglomerative force. I wish to compare my results with those in Overman and Puga
(2009), and therefore I continue to use the EG-index in the reported regressions. I discuss how the
alternative choice of usingG i impacts the results.
An industry that relies on own-industry input is similarly expected to be concentrated. Therefore,
I include I i i in the regressions to capture industry i ’s share of inputs purchased from producers within
the industry.
In models of new economic geography, the cost of transporting goods is central in determining
the relative size of agglomeration and dispersion forces. I include ’Road transports as share of value
added’ in the analysis, but controlling for transport costs is problematic since producers with high
transport cost will tend to locate production facilities close to their markets. This acts to lower ob-
served costs of transportation for these (dispersed) industries even though the underlying relation-
ship is the converse. Therefore, a priori the expected sign on this variable is undetermined.
to any 4-digit industry under the same IO-industry group.
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Finally, I control for expenditures on shipping by rail, sea, or air as share of value added. To the
extent that plants rely on these modes of transport associated with a localised infrastructure, they are
likely to choose location so as to facilitate access to ports, railways, and airports.18
2.5 Descriptives
Table 3 summarises key statistics of the empirical variables.
In the previous section, I found that Danish manufacturing shows high levels of overall industrial
agglomeration compared to other countries. However, the table shows variation in the EG-index
across industries, and a similar picture holds for the urban index.
Despite the rather narrow definition of an industry, the measure of within industry similarity in
formal skills, Cor r PI , varies from 0.10 at the 10t h percentile to 0.67 at the 90t h percentile. Thus, it is
not given that same-industry plants make use of the same type of formal qualifications.
A different characteristic of the Danish Manufacturing industry which is worth commenting on is
the high average value of services in value added compared to manufactured inputs in value added.
One explanation is that I only see inputs bought from Danish suppliers, and therefore the variables
exclude imported intermediate goods. This is likely to be more important with respect to manufac-
tured inputs than with respect to service inputs.
Table 3: Descriptives
Mean Median SE P10 P90
Dep. variables:
EG-index 0.075 0.040 0.455 -0.082 0.305
Urbanisation 0.244 0.169 0.243 0.008 0.645
Labour market variables:
PoolPI 0.947 0.666 0.867 0.351 1.823
PoolPM 0.355 0.343 0.117 0.251 0.482
PoolIM 0.159 0.092 0.182 0.038 0.390
CorrPI 0.454 0.537 0.276 0.096 0.669
CorrIM 0.820 0.860 0.137 0.634 0.952
Share of workers with BA-degree or higher 0.129 0.109 0.079 0.053 0.238
Other input variables:
R&D exp. as share of value added 0.033 0.014 0.046 0.003 0.078
Primary exp. as share of value added 0.185 0.002 0.871 0.000 0.368
Water exp. as share of value added 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004
Energy exp. as share of value added 0.041 0.032 0.043 0.012 0.073
Shipping by rail, sea, and air as share of value added 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.019
Road transport as share of value added 0.029 0.019 0.025 0.006 0.068
Manufactured goods as share of value added 0.492 0.421 0.250 0.276 0.810
Services as share of value added 0.398 0.359 0.200 0.259 0.520
Input-share weighted EG-index. 0.089 0.025 0.580 0.011 0.125
Input-share weighted urban index 0.324 0.278 0.271 0.196 0.471
Own-industry exp. as share of value added 0.146 0.087 0.153 0.021 0.312
For the dependent variables, the table variables are averages over the years 2000-2006. The right-hand side
variables are averages over the year 1993-1999. This corresponds to the regression tables.
18Other studies, do not include this as a separate measure. However, I judge that this variable is less endogenous compared
to the Road transport component.
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Before I move on to the empirical results, I show the simple correlation coefficients of the main
variables of interest in table 4.
Table 4: Correlations of the main variables of interest
EG Urban PoolPI PoolPM PoolIM CorrPI CorrIM
EG-index 1.000
Urban -0.405 1.000
PoolPI 0.296 -0.044 1.000
PoolPM 0.081 0.071 0.249 1.000
PoolIM 0.013 0.157 0.438 0.474 1.000
CorrPI 0.019 -0.221 -0.150 -0.371 -0.584 1.000
CorrIM 0.030 -0.325 -0.073 -0.189 -0.318 0.499 1.000
The EG-index and the urbanisation measure are averages over 2000-2006. The other vari-
ables are averages over the years 1993-1999. This corresponds to the regression tables.
With respect to the labour market characteristics of the industry, note that some of these are
correlated. This is in particular true for the two measures of correlation and also the labour pooling
variables show high levels of correlation.
3 Empirical results
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the following empirical equation:
Concent ra t ion i =β0 +β1Pool ki +β2MedCor r
k
i +β3Hi g hCor r
k
i
+β4Pool ki ×MedCor r ki +β5Pool ki ×Hi g hCor r ki
+φX i +εi (6)
where Concent ra t ion i is the chosen measure of spatial concentration – industrial or urban. The
parameters of interest are β1 −β5 that capture labour market effects. Pool ki , k = PI ,PM , IM is the
potential for labour pooling due to idiosyncratic volatility in labour demand. Cor r ki , k = PI , IM is
the chosen measure of skill correlation which I divide into three groups; Low, Medium, and High as
reflected by the prefixes. I return to the exact cut-offs when I present the results.
In some specifications, I include the interaction of the labour pooling variable and the skill corre-
lation variable in order to investigate whether there is a stronger relationship between idiosyncratic
volatility and geographic concentration in industries that are homogeneous in terms of skill-use. Fi-
nally, X i is a vector of control variables as described in section 2.4, and εi is an identically and inde-
pendently distributed error term.
In the analysis on localisation of industries, I estimate equation (6) by OLS. In the analysis on
urbanisation, the dependent variable is share of the industry in an urban area which is censored at
zero, and, therefore, I report the results of a tobit regression.
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The data set is a panel covering years 1992-2006, but neither location nor industry-characteristics
change much over time. Therefore, there is little information in using differences in place of levels. In-
stead, I use averages of the right-hand side variables from 1993-1999 (I lose one year when I calculate
the labour pooling measure) and averages of the concentration index from 2000-2006. This approach
is consistent with plants observing industry-characteristics before choosing their location which to
some extent diminishes concerns of reverse causality. Moreover, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) note
that the role of natural advantages are likely to be exogenous to the extent of agglomeration. And
even though the role of labour market factors and supplier-linkages are outcomes of an equilibrium
relationship in which agglomeration might also impact the right-hand side variables, agglomeration
in itself is costly (e.g. due to congestion costs). Therefore, plants have no incentives to agglomerate
unless it is to benefit from positive factors in the external economic environment.
Finally, Ellison et al. (2010) construct instrumental variables to address endogeneity concerns
in an analysis of co-location among pairwise US industries. They show that the positive effect of
the labour market characteristic – occupational similarity - on the EG-index is robust to the IV ap-
proach.19
With these remarks in mind, I now turn to the results. I start by presenting the results on factors
that lead to specialised industrial clusters. Then, I move on to the question of whether the labour
pooling motive applies to the decision of locating in an urban environment.
3.1 Industrial localisation
Table 5 shows the outcome of the analysis of industrial agglomeration. Standard errors in parenthesis
are clustered at the level of the 54 industries in the input-output tables.
Rows 1 to 7 report the coefficients of interest. In column 1, the coefficient on the labour pooling vari-
able of plants relative to the industry, Pool PI is 0.14 and significant at the 5% level confirming Krug-
man’s labour pooling hypothesis. Moreover, I check if idiosyncratic volatility relative to manufactur-
ing has similar effects on the agglomeration patterns of industries. In column 2, I compare plants to
total manufacturing, and, in column 3, I distinguish between idiosyncratic volatility within the indus-
try and of the industry relative to manufacturing. In neither of these regressions does an idiosyncratic
labour demand relative to manufacturing come out significant. With respect to the labour pooling
hypothesis it is reassuring that it is specifically idiosyncratic volatility relative to same-industry plants
19The authors report results using two sets of instruments. The first set of instruments uses UK-variables to instrument for
US variables. The second set of instruments is based on disaggregated data. The "innate" relatedness of an industry pair
is estimated using data on characteristics of industry i in regions where industry j is least present and vice versa. See the
paper for more detail on this approach.
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Table 5: Regressions of the EG-index on industry characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pool PI 0.1381** 0.1679** 0.1438** 0.1330***
(0.0636) (0.0709) (0.0634) (0.0458)
Pool PM 0.2068
(0.3614)
Pool IM -0.2903
(0.2438)
0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 -0.0079 -0.0885
(0.1624) (0.1542)
Cor r PI > 0.4 0.0743 0.0434
(0.0676) (0.0697)
Pool PI ×  0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 0.4312*
(0.2222)
Pool PI ×  Cor r PI > 0.4 0.0498
(0.0509)
Share of high-skilled 0.3086 0.7642 0.2078 0.3078 0.2496
(0.4088) (0.4834) (0.3720) (0.4270) (0.4047)
R&D expenditures -0.3756 -0.4170 -0.4486 -0.4604 -0.2538
(0.6059) (0.5648) (0.6094) (0.6350) (0.6447)
Primary -0.1353 -0.1330 -0.1431 -0.1444 -0.1251
(0.1119) (0.1209) (0.1129) (0.1136) (0.1064)
Water 7.8161 11.2898 11.1574 6.0337 -0.0880
(20.5289) (18.8400) (20.9479) (20.1237) (20.5595)
Energy -1.9592 -1.7471 -1.8123 -1.9213 -1.5657
(2.0650) (2.0472) (2.1396) (2.1203) (2.1365)
Shipping by rail, sea, and air 13.4879* 14.1449* 13.0477* 13.5932* 12.3782*
(6.9754) (7.4883) (7.2710) (7.0226) (6.2745)
Road transport 1.2013 2.0752 0.9505 1.1643 -0.1624
(2.5888) (3.2620) (2.5239) (2.6152) (1.9412)
Services -0.4437 -0.6405 -0.4571 -0.4437 -0.2906
(0.3354) (0.4272) (0.3294) (0.3324) (0.2621)
Manufacturing 0.0300 0.1060 0.0487 0.0372 0.0880
(0.1825) (0.1976) (0.1754) (0.1781) (0.1755)
IO-weighted EG-index 0.1892 0.1911 0.2006 0.2052 0.1809
(0.1530) (0.1639) (0.1558) (0.1574) (0.1519)
Own industry 0.2448 0.1156 0.2206 0.2543 0.1610
(0.3492) (0.3520) (0.3171) (0.3378) (0.3396)
Constant -0.0282 -0.0142 0.0054 -0.0883 -0.0820
(0.1067) (0.1373) (0.1030) (0.1197) (0.1178)
Observations 217 217 217 217 217
R2 0.144 0.087 0.154 0.150 0.237
OLS regression. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered according to the 54 industrial groups in
the input output tables.
Dep. variable is the EG-index (see section 2.1.1). The measure of labour pooling is based on full-
time equivalents. The educational variables are based on the number of workers at plants. The group
of industries for which Cor r PI is negative constitutes the reference group in column 4 and 5. The
interactions in column 5 are evaluated at the mean of the variables.
The variables from R&D-expenditures down to Own-industry are calculated as input relative to value
added.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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that predicts industrial clustering. The findings in these three columns are in line with the results by
Overman and Puga (2009).20
In column 4 and 5, I add the measure of the average correlation between the skill mix of plants and
the rest of the industry. It is novel to consider both the skill-dimensions and the structure of labour
demand in one analysis. In the reported regressions I have chosen to group industries according to
three levels of the Cor r PI -variable; low, medium, and high. The first group consists of those with a
negative correlation, the second group consists of those industries that show a correlation between
0 and 0.4, and the last group consists of industries showing a correlation measure higher than 0.4.
The 0.4-cut-off corresponds approximately to the 25th percentile.21 In column 5, I have subtracted
the mean of the variables when I calculate the interaction term. Therefore, the coefficient of Pool PI
is the effect of an increase in the idiosyncratic component of labour demand on the EG-index at the
averages of the correlation dummies, and equivalently for the coefficients on Cor r PI . This makes
the coefficients on Pool PI and Cor r PI comparable with those reported in column 1 and 4. In the
regressions the group with a negatively correlated skill mix is the reference group.
The results in column 4 and 5 indicate that a similar use of formal qualifications by itself does not
have an impact on the tendency of industries to form a cluster. The interactions, on the contrary, are
positive and for the medium correlated group significant.22 These results confirm to some extent the
hypothesis that plants benefit from co-location if they depend on the same type of formal qualifica-
tions and are characterised by a large idiosyncratic component in their labour demand. However, the
Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) type of idea is rejected by the data. A similar need for skills does not in
itself lead to agglomeration in specialised industrial clusters.
I have tried restricting the effect to a linear relationship using the continuous version of the mea-
sure but with little success. Both the direct effect and the interaction came out with highly insignifi-
cant coefficients. Also, I have experimented with different thresholds. In particular, dividing the high
correlation group in two. This did not add to the analysis. Overall, the positive effects arise when one
compares industries characterised by negative correlations with the group of industries characterised
20Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare the magnitudes of the estimates. First, I have adjusted the index of labour market
pooling. Second, as I have discussed in an earlier section, the exact size of the EG-measure is difficult to interpret. In
particular, the geographical scale has an impact on its size.
21Cor r PI is unevenly distributed. There are 14 observations in the low-group, 40 observations in the medium-group (the
cut-off is approximately the 25t h percentile), and 183 observations in the high-group.
22Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) predict regional specialisation around skills and the most direct way of accounting for this
is to use the within industry correlations in skill mix Cor r PI , but it is interesting to describe the formal qualifications of
the industry’s labour force a long a different dimension. An alternative interpretation is that a localised industry uses a
specialised set of skills relative to the rest of the economy. In a regression not reported here, I tried including Cor r PI , but
the data actually shows quite the opposite picture. Industries that look like the rest of manufacturing show a tendency to
be localised. An explanation is that a very agglomerated industries cannot specialise production to the same degree as for
example industries located together with a large number of suppliers. The measureCor r PI is therefore better suited to test
the hypothesis.
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by a medium level of skill correlation. One explanation could be that the correlation-measure takes
into account both the level and field of education. The results indicate that conditional on a certain
degree of skill-match, informal learning at the job is sufficient for labour-sharing.
The final labour market characteristic that I include in the analysis is the share of the industry’s
workforce with a BA, Master’s or PhD-degree. The hypothesis is that these workers in particular have
much to gain from thick labour markets if these generate better matching of workers and firms and/or
superior conditions for learning. The data does not support this. Since this is a variable that is often
found to be positively correlated with gains from agglomeration, I checked whether excluding the
pooling variable from the estimations would produce different results. I do not include the results
here but just note that the coefficient does increase while the coefficient continues to be insignificant.
Rather than putting too much emphasis on this finding, I hypothesise that the specialised clusters in
the present data set might be too small to generate these types of effects. The estimations in the next
section that is concerned with the urban labour market show very different results.
I now turn to the variables that control for non-labour market characteristics of the industry.
These variables are based on the input-output tables from Statistics Denmark and are only available
at a higher level of aggregation amounting to 54 industries. Therefore, they are less precise than the
labour market variables. Bertinelli and Decop (2005) discuss in detail how to apply the EG-index to
small countries and conclude that it can be difficult to compare levels across countries of different
size. Since the studies that I mostly refer to are on the scale of the UK or US economy, I find it relevant
to devote some space to the discussion of the results.
Except for the extent to which the industry relies on localised infrastructure (Shipping by rail, sea,
and air) non-labour market characteristics do not seem important determinants of agglomeration.
The lack of significance is in contrast to results on agglomeration in UK local labour markets (Over-
man and Puga (2009)) though the estimated signs for the most part are consistent with those in that
analysis. Except for manufacturing as share of value added and transport cost, the signs on the coeffi-
cients in the present analysis are in agreement with the results in that paper. However, as I discussed
previously (section 3), the costs of transporting goods are difficult to measure and therefore also dif-
ficult to interpret, and Overman and Puga (2009) are themselves somewhat surprised of the negative,
significant sign on manufactured goods.23,24
23Additional support for the findings in the present analysis is that Barrios et al. (2003) in a pooled sample of Belgian,
Portuguese, and Irish manufacturing data find no significant effects of similar variables using geographic units that are
comparable in size with the Danish local labour markets. This is in line with results in Rosenthal and Strange (2001) using
US zip-codes as the geographical unit.
24One of the local labour markets contains the urban area of Copenhagen in which the labour market dynamics might be
different from those of the rest of the local labour markets. For this reason, I also tried including a dummy-variable taking
on the value of one if the industry is urban. Here urban industry was defined as having more than 50 percent of employment
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Other authors have found that the concentration of input suppliers is a positive determinant of
agglomeration (see Holmes (1999), Overman and Puga (2009)). Following the suggestion by Overman
and Puga (2009), I include an input-share weighted EG-index to capture effects of vertical linkages,
but this variable is insignificant in all regressions. This is a little surprising as proximity to suppliers
are usually thought to be important. To be able to better compare the results with those in Overman
and Puga (2009) who do not correct for clustering of their input-output measures, I calculated non-
clustered, robust standard errors. Using these, I find that the coefficient on the input-share weighted
EG-index is significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, before I reject that this is not an important
factor in Danish manufacturing, I refer to the analysis on the urban labour market in which I find
different results.25
In summary, the analysis in this section suggests that even after controlling for a wide range of
potential agglomerative forces, the labour sharing motive is a significant determinant of industrial
localisation. This naturally raises a parallel question of whether a similar effect is at play in urban
labour markets. This is the subject of the subsequent section.
3.2 Urbanisation
The EG-measure is constructed to capture clustering of same-industry plants. In this section, I turn
to an analysis of location in urban areas. In general, local labour markets that evolve around a single
industry and an urban labour market differ in their dynamics. In particular, diversity in skills and
knowledge is often emphasised as an advantage of urban areas in contrast to the specialised nature of
industrial clusters.26 Keeping this in mind, the purpose of this section is not to draw in new empirical
effects. Rather, in a parallel manner to the above analysis, I investigate whether sharing labour can
be considered a motive for industries that locate in an urban area.
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the share of industry employment in the Greater Copen-
hagen area, and I take all of manufacturing to be the relevant reference industry. Since in some in-
dustries it might be optimal for plants not to be present in urban areas in which case the variable is
zero, I report the results of a tobit regression allowing for a corner response at zero (11 out of the 217
industries are not present in the Greater Copenhagen area).27,28 To save on space, marginal effects
are left out of the table. These can be found in Appendix A.
in an urban area. This did not change the results. In the next subsection, I return to the issue of urban labour markets.
25As I briefly discussed in section 2.4, an alternative measure of the localisation of suppliers uses the raw concentration
index in place of the EG-index. I experimented with this and found that this alternative measure likewise generates positive
but insignificant coefficients.
26See Jacobs (1969).
27Naturally, the dependent variable is also censored at 1, but this upper limit is only relevant for 2 industries, and I abstract
from this in the analysis.
28In this section, I maintain leaving out 1-plant industries of the regressions.
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In the discussion that follows, I contrast the findings with the results in the previous section.
However, note that, since the scales of the outcome variables differ, it is only signs and significance
levels that one can compare.
Column 1 in table 6 contains the result when I only include the variable Pool IM together with
the set of controls in the regression. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%-level. This is
in contrast to the result reported by Overman and Puga (2009) who find a positive but insignificant
coefficient on their measure of urbanisation. However, a short-coming of the Pool IM -variable is that
the reference industry might be too broadly defined, and that the positive correlation captures some-
thing else than a potential for labour sharing. Therefore, it is even more important in this analysis to
take into account the overlap in skill use between industry i and manufacturing.
Jumping to column 3, I test whether industries characterised by a large idiosyncratic component
in labour demand relative to manufacturing and a matching use of formal qualifications show a larger
tendency to be urban than other industries. As in the analysis on industry-specific clusters, I have
grouped industries according to the degree of correlation with the reference industry. Since Cor r IM
is distributed differently than Cor r PI (for example, none of the industries has a negative value of
this variable), I use different cut-off values than above. The first group of industries are those with an
average correlation with manufacturing of less than 0.6, the second group are those with a correlation
in the range of 0.6 and 0.7, and the last group are those industries with a correlation measure above
0.7.29 Again, I have subtracted the mean of the variables before calculating the interaction term such
that the coefficients on Pool IM represent the effects at the averages of the correlation-dummies and
similarly for the coefficient on Cor r IM .
The results in column 3 confirm the hypothesis that plants cluster if they have a large scope for
sharing labour. As in the analysis on industry-specific labour markets, a correlated use of skills does
not by itself lead to agglomeration, in contrast it has a negative coefficient.
Importantly, the interactions with Pool IM are positive and significant at the 5%-level and the re-
lationship seems stronger than in the previous analysis. As I discussed above, the explanation might
lie in the definition of the skill-correlation variables. They address the workers’ formal qualifications
neglecting the other important source of human capital accumulation; on-the-job-learning. It might
be reasonable to assume that informal skills and know-how accumulated while working have a large
industry-specific component whereas skills acquired through formal schooling are of a more gen-
eral nature. The implicit assumption in the urban analysis is that workers move between industries
in which case they lose industry-specific know-how thereby raising the importance of their formal
29There are 18 observations in the low correlation group, 27 observations in the medium correlation group and 72 observa-
tions in the high correlation group.
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Table 6: Regressions of urban-index on industry characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pool IM 0.2356** 0.1606* 0.1919* 0.3550***
(0.0915) (0.0937) (0.1063) (0.1195)
0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 -0.0188 -0.0817 -0.0738
(0.0790) (0.0718) (0.0678)
Cor r IM > 0.7 -0.1302** -0.1779*** -0.1691***
(0.0608) (0.0496) (0.0478)
Pool IM ×  0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 0.5904** 0.5771**
(0.2322) (0.2307)
Pool IM ×  Cor r IM > 0.7 0.4917*** 0.5616***
(0.1486) (0.1327)
Pool PI -0.0680***
(0.0195)
Share of high-skilled 0.6362** 0.5133* 0.6106** 0.8367***
(0.3185) (0.3046) (0.2835) (0.2928)
R&D expenditures 0.6734 0.6851 0.6363 0.6622
(0.5831) (0.5117) (0.5004) (0.5076)
Primary -0.0282 -0.0162 -0.0130 -0.0094
(0.0696) (0.0592) (0.0568) (0.0563)
Water -10.7049 -5.1680 -5.3559 -6.1707
(13.6672) (12.0545) (12.6696) (12.5399)
Energy -0.0575 0.1555 0.1650 0.2370
(0.9047) (0.8656) (0.8737) (0.9002)
Shipping by rail, sea, and air -3.9561 -4.4986* -4.5703* -3.9324
(2.7414) (2.5580) (2.6659) (2.6919)
Road transport -0.7462 -0.4782 -0.4937 -0.0245
(0.8641) (0.8260) (0.8159) (0.7933)
Services -0.5532 -0.4445 -0.4488 -0.4518*
(0.3567) (0.2968) (0.3102) (0.2730)
Manufacturing -0.4196** -0.3660** -0.3617** -0.3023*
(0.1951) (0.1745) (0.1786) (0.1567)
IO-weighted EG-index -0.3837** -0.3679*** -0.3631** -0.3330***
(0.1554) (0.1379) (0.1409) (0.1237)
Urban EG-index 1.5814*** 1.3915*** 1.3796** 1.2374***
(0.6034) (0.5218) (0.5404) (0.4643)
Own industry 0.1329 0.0145 0.0010 -0.0623
(0.4175) (0.3556) (0.3577) (0.3413)
Constant 0.1013* 0.2205*** 0.2597*** 0.2645***
(0.0603) (0.0776) (0.0697) (0.0696)
σ 0.2224*** 0.2182*** 0.2154*** 0.2098***
(0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0174)
Observations 217 217 217 217
Log-likelihood 6.020 10.05 12.72 18.12
Tobit regression with censoring at zero. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered accord-
ing to the 54 industrial groups in the input output tables. Marginal effects, evaluated at the
mean of the variables, are left out of the table but can be found in appendix A.
Dep. variable is the fraction of industry-employment in the Greater Copenhagen Area. The
measures of labour pooling are based on full-time equivalents. The educational variables are
based on the number of workers at the plants. The reference group consists of industries that
have a skill correlation with the rest of manufacturing of less than 0.6. The interactions in
column 3 and 4 are evaluated at the mean of the variables.
P:plant, I: industry, M: manufacturing.
Variables R&D-exp.– Own-industry are inputs relative to value added.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%,***Significant at 1%.
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qualifications relative to workers who rely on an industry-specific labour market.
In the last column, I add Pool I P to the regressions. The variable comes out negative and signifi-
cant in these estimations and this confirms the conclusion from the previous section that a large id-
iosyncratic component in labour demand within the industry is a factor in the formation of industry-
specific clusters. In principle, a high value of the EG-index could be a result of the industry being
over-represented in an urban area compared to overall manufacturing. But this result re-enforces the
conclusion that an idiosyncratic labour demand is associated with clustering in industry-specific lo-
cations. At the same time, note that including this measure also increases the coefficient on Pool IM .
Finally, in these regressions, I have controlled for the same set of factors as in the analysis on in-
dustrial localisation but furthermore added an extra control variable. To better capture the potential
external effects in this new setting, I have added an index that captures dependency on local urban
suppliers to account for the parallel effect of the input-share weighted EG-index in the previous sec-
tion. In that analysis clustering of local suppliers did not seem important, but that conclusion is
rejected in this section. Dependency on urban suppliers has a strong positive effect on urbanisation
and its pole – localisation of suppliers – comes out negative and significant.30,31 Likewise, in the pre-
vious section, I discussed the apparent lack of significance of the share of high-skilled workers in that
analysis. Table 6 shows different results. Use of high-skilled labour has a significant positive impact
on the tendency of industries to agglomerate in urban areas which is in accordance with results found
in other studies.
4 Robustness
In this section, I present a number of robustness checks. The upper part of table 7 presents results
on the industry location analysis, and the lower part presents results on the urbanisation analysis. In
order to save on space, I only report the coefficients on the main variables of interest; the labour pool-
ing variables, the correlation dummies and their interactions. Table 8 in a similar manner presents
regressions in which additional variables are included to control for possible effects of industry struc-
ture.
30I also ran the regressions using a broader definition of urban. In these regressions I used the share of industry-
employment in the Copenhagen and Århus commuting areas as the dependent variable. According to this definition, only
one industry has a zero share of employment in an urban area.The regressions showed a similar pattern as in table 6, but
the effect are weaker.
31Adding this control variable does not change the reported results on labour pooling and skill correlation.
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Table 7: Robustness checks
4t h digit 8t h digit Balanced sample Spin-outs
Localisation (EG-index)
Pool PI 0.1381** 0.1154*** 0.1389*** 0.0804***
(0.0672) (0.0366) (0.0323) (0.0415)
0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 0.1123 -0.0616 -0.0065 -0.1335
(0.1492) (0.1294) (0.1272) (0.1520)
Pool PI > 0.4 0.1189 0.0493 0.904 0.0323
(0.1324) (0.0553) (0.1074) (0.0733)
Pool PI ×  0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 0.2435 0.3041* 0.3583 0.1728*
(0.1836) (0.1689) (0.2663) (0.1563)
Pool PI ×  Cor r PI > 0.4 0.3268* 0.0366 -0.0569 0.0206
(0.1867) (0.0422) (0.0996) (0.0493)
R2 0.149 0.207 0.336 0.132
4t h digit 8t h digit Balanced sample
Urbanisation
Pool IM 0.2475** 0.2129* -0.0292
(0.1078) (0.1263) (0.1332)
0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 -0.2809*** -0.0518 -0.0431
(0.0883) (0.0586) (0.0769)
Cor r IM > 0.6 -0.2064** -0.1541*** -0.1810***
(0.0815) (0.0435) (0.0502)
Pool IM ×  0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 -0.9716** 0.4667** 2.2213**
(0.4831) (0.2072) (0.9362)
Pool IM ×  Cor r IM > 0.7 0.7054*** 0.4227** 1.1900**
(0.1919) (0.1803) (0.4836)
ll
Number of obs. 217 217 193 217
The upper part of the table corresponds to column 5 of table 5. The lower part corresponds to column
3 of table 6. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered according to the 54 industrial groups in the
input output tables.
P:plant, I: industry, M: manufacturing.
Control variables as presented in section 2.4 are included in the regressions.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%,***Significant at 1%.
4.1 The skill mix variables
The use of formal qualifications to determine homogeneity or heterogeneity in the skill mix of plants
and industries is new in the empirical literature on agglomeration. There is not a one to one rela-
tionship between skills acquired in schools and the jobs one can hold, and this offers some freedom
on how to group workers. In the main analysis, I have grouped workers according to the 6t h out of
8 digits, but in the tables I present results for two alternative choices. The first column of the table
uses a less detailed level of aggregation; the 4t h digit instead of the 6t h digit, and column 2 reports
the results if a more detailed classification is chosen; the 8t h digit.32
Starting with the localisation analysis, the upper part of the table shows that using the 4t h-digit
definition, makes the interaction between Pool PI and the high-correlation dummy relatively more
32I am aware that different levels of detail could apply to different subgroups of educations due to different degrees of
substitutability, but I do not address this issue in this paper.
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important compared to the medium-correlation dummy. This is in line with workers being less sub-
stitutable across 4-digit groups than 6-digit groups. Using the 8t h digit does not alter the coefficient
on the interactions much compared to the 6t h-definition. It does have a small negative impact on the
coefficient on the Pool PI -index
For the analysis on urbanisation, using the 8t h-digit does not impact the analysis markedly. How-
ever, using the 4t h-digit in place of the 6t h-digit have an impact in the sense that it lays more impor-
tance on the high-correlation group compared to the medium-correlation group.
In light of the discussion on the relationship between formal schooling and human capital ac-
cumulated on the job in facilitating mobility, it is not surprising that the choice of detail in the skill-
definition has an impact on the exact outcome of the analysis though the overall picture is robust to
these changes.
4.2 Balanced sample
The variables EG , Pool PI , and Cor r PI are only defined for industries that consist of more than one
plant. In the sample, there are a number of one-plant industries which are then left out of the analysis.
However, for a number of small industries entry or exit of plants imply that they change status during
the sample period.33 Three additional industries (1588, 2630, 2721, and 3410) were left out of the main
analysis because of missing observations in many years, but in order to keep as many industries as
possible in the analysis the sample generally included all industries with observations in both time-
periods 1993-1999 and 2000-2006. To address any concerns with respect to this choice, Column 3
of table 7 reports the results using only the balanced sample with 193 observations instead of 217
observations in the main analysis. All the industries that I leave out have at least 8 yearly observations
and include both industries with a growing, decreasing, and stable number of industries.34
In the analysis on specialised industrial clusters (upper part of the table), the coefficient onPool PI
is robust to this change whereas the interaction within Cor r PI loses significance. The analysis on
urbanisation shows the opposite picture as Pool IM completely loses importance whereas the inter-
33In addition to real plant-openings or plant-closures, re-classifications of plants from one industry to another can cause
this.
34The excluded industries are: 1585 (Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products), 1586
(Processing of tea and coffee ), 1594 (Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines), 1810 (Manufacture of leather clothes),
2233 (Reproduction of computer media), 2413 (Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals), 2464 (Manufacture of
photographic chemical material), 2465 (Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media),2611(Manufacture of flat glass), 2622
(Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures), 2623 (Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings), 2652(Manufac-
ture of lime), 2731(Cold drawing ), 2741 (Precious metals production ), 2743 (Lead, zinc and tin production), 2744 (Copper
production), 2745 (Other non-ferrous metal production), 2752 (Casting of steel), 3520 (Manufacture of railway and tramway
locomotives and rolling stock), 3621 (Striking of coins), 1558 (Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic
food), 2630 (Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags), 2721 (Manufacture of cast iron tubes), 3410 (Manufacture of motor
vehicles).
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actions with the correlation-dummies become more important. Together, these results might re-
flect that within the industry plants are fairly similar such that skill-correlation only matters to some
industries, making the interactions sensitive to the composition of the data set, whereas between
industries the degree of skill-correlation interacted with the labour pooling index is the relevant ex-
planatory variable with respect to labour sharing.
4.3 Spin-outs and the labour pooling index
I have constructed Pool PI such that it uses information on employment at all workplaces in the in-
dustry. One concern is that spin-outs contribute positively to the value of the index but are located in
proximity to the founder’s previous employer for reasons different than labour pooling. This would
contribute to a positive relationship between the index that I have constructed and the EG-index.
Therefore, I report the outcome of an estimation in which I have excluded entrants from Pool I P . The
coefficient on Pool PI decreases to 0.0804 revealing that entrants might, partly, be contributing to
the relationship reported in the main analysis. Similarly, the interactions with the skill correlation
variables decrease in magnitude.
In the urban analysis, where manufacturing is the reference industry, this type of robustness
check is not relevant.
4.4 Industry structure: EG-index
Kim et al. (2000) argue that the EG-index is biased upwards for industries consisting only of a few
plants relative to the number of geographic units. If these industries also differ systematically with
respect to the measures of labour pooling and skill correlation, it is a concern to the reported results.
To address this issue, I include the number of plants in the industry as an extra control variable to
investigate if it has an impact on the relationship between Pool PI , Cor r PI and the EG-index. The
results are reported in table 8, and they show that the conclusions are robust to expanding the set of
controls in this way. Moreover, the variable "number of plants" does not by itself have an impact on
the tendency of same-industry plants to cluster.
4.5 Industry structure: Urbanisation
The index of urbanisation that I use is a simple one, and, in contrast to the EG-index, I do not take
into account the structure of the industry. When measuring localisation of industries, the concern
is that scale economies at the plant level show up as spatial localisation if one neglects to control
for the degree of concentration in the industry, but measuring urbanisation does not lead to similar
concerns. However, to address concerns with respect to a possible link between the structure of the
108
industry and urbanisation, I carry out the analysis with a Herfindahl index and a measure of the
average size of plants included. Table 8 shows the results. The direct effect of Pool IM on urbanisation
loses importance, but the interactions with the skill correlation dummies are robust to this change.
Table 8: Robustness check: Industry structure
Localisation (EG-index) Urbanisation
Pool PI 0.1336*** Pool IM 0.0902
(0.0462) (0.1613)
0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 -0.0890 0.6≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.7 -0.0667
(0.1544) (0.0699)
Cor r PI > 0.4 0.419 Cor r IM > 0.7 -0.1674***
(0.0711) (0.0522)
Pool PI ×  0≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.4 0.4317 Pool IM ×  0.6≤Cor r PI ≤ 0.7 0.6139**
(0.2231) (0.2529)
Pool PI ×  Cor r PI > 0.4 0.0506 Pool IM ×  Cor r PI > 0.7 0.4889
0.0522 (0.1447)
Number of plants 0.0000 Herfindahl 0.0945
(0.0001) (0.0007)
Size of plants -0.0008
(0.1603)
Number of obs. 217 217
Column 1 of the table corresponds to column 5 of table 5. Column 2 of the table corresponds to
column 3 of table 6. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered according to the 54 industrial groups
in the input output tables.
P:plant, I: industry, M: manufacturing.
Control variables as presented in section 2.4 are included in the regressions.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%,***Significant at 1%.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether sharing a common pool of labour is
a source of agglomeration. I study two sources of labour sharing. The first of these is the labour
pooling argument due to Krugman (1991). It states that firms form industrial clusters in order to iron
out idiosyncratic productivity shocks because geographical closeness facilitates mobility of workers
from low to high productivity firms. An alternative idea due to Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) is that
clustering of firms using similar skills in production encourages investments in human capital as
competition for labour among employers prevents ex post appropriation.
I test these theories using a detailed employer-employee data set on Danish Manufacturing cov-
ering years 1992 to 2006. A study by Overman and Puga (2009) on UK data shows that the Krugman-
motive is important, and Ellison et al. (2010) find, using a functional definition of skills, that two
industries co-locate if they use the same type of skills. This paper adds to these findings in several
ways. First, I consider the relative importance of these effects, and I investigate how the Krugman-
motive varies with the degree of homogeneity in the skill mix of the labour force. Second, I use formal
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qualifications of the labour force to account for the skills which sheds light on a different perspective
than a functional definition.
The economic theories that inspire this paper are themselves motivated by observed patterns
of agglomeration in industry-specific clusters, and this is the focus of the main analysis. Thus, the
analysis relates clustering of same-industry plants to their scope for sharing labour. The estimations
suggest that even after having controlled for a large set of alternative agglomerative forces, an id-
iosyncratic labour demand is a strong driver behind the formation of industrial agglomeration. I do
not find a similar strong support for the Rotemberg-Saloner type of idea.
In an extension, I turn to an analysis of location in urban labour markets. In general, local labour
markets that evolve around a single industry and an urban, diverse labour market are thought to differ
in their dynamics, and it is interesting to investigate whether sharing of labour plays a role in urban
labour markets. The idea in this analysis is that labour sharing takes place between the industry and
the rest of manufacturing rather than within the industry. The key finding is that the Krugman motive
also in this analysis comes out significant. Specifically, industries with both an uncorrelated labour
demand relative to all of manufacturing and with a skill composition that resembles manufacturing
have a significantly higher tendency to agglomerate in urban areas than other industries. This sug-
gests that matching formal qualifications play a more important role in facilitating worker mobility
in the urban labour market than in the industry-specific clusters.
This paper raises questions about the role of formal qualifications in facilitating mobility of work-
ers between employers and inducing agglomeration that are interesting to pursue in future work.
Even though I find that homogeneity in the mix of formal qualifications play a role both in the industry-
specific and the urban labour market, the effect seems strongest in the urban labour market in which
mobility is likely to take place across industries. One explanation is that workers to a larger degree rely
on industry-specific on-the-job learning when moving across employers within the industry whereas
they lose this type of informal know-how when they move across industries. To learn more about
this question, one can use the Ellison-Glaeser index to measure industrial localisation of plants from
different industries and relate this to the indexes of labour pooling and skill correlation used in the
analyses of this paper.
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A Urban analysis, marginal effects
Table 9: Regressions of urban-index on industry characteristics (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
reg-coef. marg reg-coef. marg reg-coef. marg reg-coef. marg
Pool IM 0.2356** 0.2019** 0.1606* 0.1384* 0.1919* 0.1659* 0.3550*** 0.3093***
(0.0915) (0.0808) (0.0937) (0.0823) (0.1063) (0.0932) (0.1195) (0.1064)
0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 -0.0188 -0.0161 -0.0817 -0.0678 -0.0738 -0.0620
(0.0790) (0.0670) (0.0718) (0.0569) (0.0678) (0.0547)
Cor r IM > 0.7 -0.1302** -0.1164** -0.1779*** -0.1610*** -0.1691*** -0.1538***
(0.0608) (0.0571) (0.0496) (0.0472) (0.0478) (0.0457)
Pool IM× 0.5904** 0.5106** 0.5771** 0.5028** 
0.6≤Cor r IM ≤ 0.7 (0.2322) (0.1993) (0.2307) (0.2007)
Pool IM× 0.4917*** 0.4252*** 0.5616*** 0.4893*** 
Cor r IM > 0.7

(0.1486) (0.1258) (0.1327) (0.1137)
Pool PI -0.0680*** -0.0593***
(0.0195) (0.0170)
High-skilled 0.6362** 0.5452** 0.5133* 0.4423* 0.6106** 0.5280** 0.8367*** 0.7289***
(0.3185) (0.2734) (0.3046) (0.2617) (0.2835) (0.2459) (0.2928) (0.2546)
R&D exp. 0.6734 0.5771 0.6851 0.5903 0.6363 0.5502 0.6622 0.5769
(0.5831) (0.4990) (0.5117) (0.4409) (0.5004) (0.4312) (0.5076) (0.4414)
Primary -0.0282 -0.0241 -0.0162 -0.0140 -0.0130 -0.0113 -0.0094 -0.0082
(0.0696) (0.0598) (0.0592) (0.0511) (0.0568) (0.0492) (0.0563) (0.0491)
Water -10.7049 -9.1741 -5.1680 -4.4530 -5.3559 -4.6314 -6.1707 -5.3761
(13.6672) (11.7974) (12.0545) (10.4242) (12.6696) (10.9961) (12.5399) (10.9745)
Energy -0.0575 -0.0493 0.1555 0.1340 0.1650 0.1427 0.2370 0.2065
(0.9047) (0.7752) (0.8656) (0.7464) (0.8737) (0.7561) (0.9002) (0.7853)
Shipping by -3.9561 -3.3904 -4.4986* -3.8762* -4.5703* -3.9521* -3.9324 -3.4261
rail, sea, and air (2.7414) (2.3379) (2.5580) (2.1895) (2.6659) (2.2847) (2.6919) (2.3250)
Road transport -0.7462 -0.6395 -0.4782 -0.4120 -0.4937 -0.4269 -0.0245 -0.0214
(0.8641) (0.7445) (0.8260) (0.7143) (0.8159) (0.7087) (0.7933) (0.6913)
Services -0.5532 -0.4741 -0.4445 -0.3830 -0.4488 -0.3881 -0.4518* -0.3936*
(0.3567) (0.3060) (0.2968) (0.2556) (0.3102) (0.2682) (0.2730) (0.2375)
Manufacturing -0.4196** -0.3596** -0.3660** -0.3153** -0.3617** -0.3128** -0.3023* -0.2634*
(0.1951) (0.1685) (0.1745) (0.1512) (0.1786) (0.1551) (0.1567) (0.1373)
IO-weighted -0.3837** -0.3288** -0.3679*** -0.3170*** -0.3631** -0.3140** -0.3330*** -0.2901***
EG-index (0.1554) (0.1329) (0.1379) (0.1187) (0.1409) (0.1217) (0.1237) (0.1077)
urband 1.5814*** 1.3553*** 1.3915*** 1.1990*** 1.3796** 1.1930** 1.2374*** 1.0781***
EG-index (0.6034) (0.5186) (0.5218) (0.4497) (0.5404) (0.4673) (0.4643) (0.4043)
Own industry 0.1329 0.1139 0.0145 0.0125 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0623 -0.0543
(0.4175) (0.3585) (0.3556) (0.3065) (0.3577) (0.3094) (0.3413) (0.2972)
Constant 0.1013* 0.2205*** 0.2597*** 0.2645***
(0.0603) (0.0776) (0.0697) (0.0696)
σ 0.2224*** 0.2182*** 0.2154*** 0.2098***
(0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0174)
Observations 217 217 217 217
Log-likelihood 6.020 10.05 12.72 18.12
This table reports the marginal effects, evaluated at the average values of the variables, of the regressions reported in 6.
Tobit regression with censoring at zero. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered according to the 54 industrial groups in the input output
tables. Dep. variable is the fraction of industry-employment in the Greater Copenhagen Area. The measures of labour pooling are based on
full-time equivalents. The educational variables are based on the number of workers at the plants. The reference group consists of industries
that have a skill correlation with the rest of manufacturing of less than 0.6. The interactions in column 3 and 4 are evaluated at the mean of the
variables.
P:plant, I: industry, M: manufacturing.
Variables R&D-exp.– Own-industry are inputs relative to value added.
* Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%,***Significant at 1%
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